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3 Foreword by 
Mr Roberto Formigoni 
Chairman of the 
European Parliament's 
Political Affairs Committee 
There are basic truths which are so obvious and repeated so often that 
we gradually lose sight of their importance. They are like the main girder 
of a building: after a while we think of it as a gratuitous embellishment 
rather than as  a vital structural support and believe that the building 
could dispense with it altogether. 
This is a very apt metaphor for the role of defence in Europe: defence has 
provided a very stable structure to support the fragile equilibrium which 
made Europe a haven of peace and freedom for the last 40 years. 
Forty years - the space of a generation - are only a brief moment in 
history but long enough for memories to grow dim:  the longer peace 
lasts, the more incongruous and unacceptable the 'preparations for war' 
needed to preserve peace will appear. It thus becomes indispensable not 
only to explain to the public the real significance of defence but to enable 
each citizen to perceive it as an integral part of public life. 
This is, of course, a matter for politicians and the most straightforward 
and natural way for them to do this is by appealing to solidarity. Once 
the citizens of Europe become fully aware that they share common inter-
ests based on a common identity they will quickly understand the direct 
link between democratic freedom and the defence of this freedom in a 
world in crisis.  They will then have grasped a fundamental principle, 
namely that defence can only be justified as a component of security, a 
political idea with far-reaching implications for the Community. 
5 The founding fathers of the European institutions had understood this 
when  they  tried  to set  up  the  European  Defence  Community.  It  is 
symptomatic that this initiative failed primarily for political reasons. 
In 1954 memories of  the recent conflict between the States of  Europe and 
the task of the reconstruction of the international community obscured 
the need for European solidarity in matters of security. 
This was more than a momentary oversight: for more than three decades 
security remained taboo in the Community institutions, notably in the 
European Parliament where it occasioned several notorious clashes be-
tween those who thought that the Community should deal with defence 
matters and those who considered that it was exclusively a matter for the 
Member States and defence organizations dominated by them. 
While the need for European solidarity in security matters is now gener-
ally recognized in principle, there are still a number of major problems 
which must be solved before such a policy can be implemented, notably 
the question of determining the policies of  each of the Member States in a 
scenario of inter-bloc confrontation, the dependence of Europe on the 
United States'  defence  aid  and the multiplicity of threats to Europe. 
These threats change very rapidly owing to various factors such as the 
development of new technologies - implying a constant reassessment of 
the very idea of defence - and the internationalization of local conflicts, 
the principal cause of the rise of terrorism which is directed mainly at 
Europe both because of  its influence in the world and the freedom it offers. 
This is why efforts to obtain recognition of  the Community's competence 
in security matters have been gathering momentum. I should like to take 
the opportunity here to pay tribute to my predecessors, most of whom 
are still members of our institution: it is due to their increasing initiatives 
during the last parliamentary term that the Political Affairs Committee 
was able as soon as it was reconstituted in 1984, to set up a Subcom-
mittee on Security and Disarmament in recognition of this development. 
It is this subcommittee which prepared the public hearing held by the 
Political Affairs Committee on 18 and 19 December 1985, the main acts 
of which are published in this brochure. 
The high standard of this hearing and all the work undertaken by the 
subcommittee confirm that in  setting up  this  subcommittee we  have 
made an investment for the future, an investment which we entrusted 
from the very outset to the dynamic chairmanship of Hans-Gert Poetter-
ing who has written the following introduction to this brochure. 
6 .  The need for a 
European security policy 
Introduction by Mr Hans-Gert Poettering, Chairman of the European 
Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament 
The institution of European political cooperation (EPC)  in  1970 en-
dowed the Community with a coordinating mechanism which has on 
many occasions lent momentum to the process of integration of the EEC 
Member States in a political community. From the start it was acknow-
ledged that political cooperation also involved security policy matters. 
This view was reflected clearly in the Report on European Union1 drawn 
up at the end of 1975 on behalf of the European Council by the then 
Prime Minister of Belgium, Leo Tindemans, which declared that security 
policy was  necessarily  a  part of the responsibilities  of the  European 
Union. In consequence, the report called on the EEC Member States to 
institute  regular  exchanges  of  opinions  on  their  specific  security 
problems.  The  London  Report  on European Political  Cooperation,2 
adopted in  October 1981  by  the Foreign  Ministers of the  10 Mem-
ber States,  confirmed that this call  did not go  unheeded.  This report 
laid down that the flexible  and pragmatic approach which in the past 
had made it possible to examine the political aspects of security in the 
framework of EPC would be retained in the future. 
In  signing  the  Solemn  Declaration  on European  Union  on  19 June 
1983, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States con-
firmed this responsibility for security policy.  The document on which 
this declaration was based (the Genscher  I Colombo Act) expressed the 
1  Supplement 1/76 - Bull. EC. 
2  PE 75.249, 20.10.1982. 
7 desire to take measures in the framework of EPC on the coordination of 
the positions of the Member States on the political and economic aspects 
of security. 
With the signature of the Single European Act by the Heads of State or 
Government early in 1986, the Member States of the European Com-
munity, now 12 in number, again undertook to attach due importance to 
cooperation in security policy matters. The preamble to this document 
revising the Community Treaties stresses that the Signatory States should 
act with consistency and solidarity to protect their common interests and 
together make their own contribution to the preservation of interna-
tional peace and security. In order to carry out this self-imposed duty, 
the High Contracting Parties assert that they are ready to coordinate 
their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of 
security and are determined jointly to maintain the technological and in-
dustrial conditions necessary for their security.  They openly acknow-
ledge the significance of close security policy cooperation for the process 
of integration, stressing that the development of a foreign-policy identity 
for Europe will be fostered precisely by this type of cooperation. 
If  it can now and in future be taken as read that cooperation on security 
policy  between  the Member States  is  a  firmly  established element in 
Community policies, it should not be forgotten that this development 
would not have been possible without the constant and determined ad-
vocacy of the idea of a Community security policy by the European Par-
liament. To say that Parliament was the driving force  behind this de-
velopment would be no exaggeration. 
Back in April1973 the EP adopted a resolution, on the basis of a report 1 
drawn up by Mr Mommersteg on behalf of the Political Affairs Com-
mittee, on political cooperation and political union in Europe,2  a main 
premise of which was that cooperation in the foreign policy sphere could 
in practice very rarely be separated from defence and security policy. 
Parliament  took  new  initiatives  in  197  5  to  promote  security  policy 
cooperation. It adopted a resolution3 submitted on the basis of a report 
by Mr Bertrand4 on European Union, which expressed the intention of 
strengthening cooperation in the field of security and including security 
policy in the powers of a future European Union. A resolution on the 
1  Doc. 12/73. 
2  OJ C 26, 30.4.1973. 
3  OJ C 179, 6.8.1975. 
4  Doc. 174/75. 
8 effects of a European foreign policy on defence questions1 adopted at the 
end of 197  5 deplored the fact that there had been no progress towards 
the harmonization of the defence policies of the Member States of the 
European Community and called on them to strengthen the North At-
lantic Alliance by developing their own specifically European effort and 
to  rationalize  their  production  of  defensive  armaments.  This  last 
proposal was taken up in more detail in the resolution on European 
armaments  procurement  cooperation  adopted  in  June  1978,2  which 
called on the Commission to submit a European action programme for 
armaments cooperation within the framework of a common industrial 
policy. 
A further milestone on the path to security policy cooperation between 
EEC Member States was the adoption by the EP in July 1981 of the res-
olution on European political cooperation and the role of the European 
Parliament, 3 which stressed the significance of the decision taken by the 
Foreign Ministers in May 1981  to include European security matters 
covered by European political cooperation and at the same time called 
for a continuation and expansion of this security policy cooperation. 
A further resolution was adopted in December 1981,4 this time on the 
surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and 
strategic materials for the countries of the European Community. 
In January 1983 the European Parliament adopted by a large majority a 
resolution dealing directly with the connection between European secur-
ity and European political cooperation,  5 which was to prove central to 
the further development of security policy cooperation. Based on an an-
alysis of the joint security interests of the EC Member States, it called for 
a European peace and security concept to be  drawn up and put into 
practice, based on the principles of detente, arms control and peaceful 
coexistence between all States and peoples. 
I  OJ c 7, 12.1.1976. 
The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Lord 
Gladwyn (Doc. 429/74). 
2  OJ C 163, 10.7.1978. 
The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr 
Klepsch (Doc. 83/78). 
3  OJ C 234, 14.9.1981. 
The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Lady 
Elles (Doc. 1-335/81). 
4  OJ C 327, 14.12.1981. 
s  OJ C 42, 14.2.1983. 
The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr 
Haagerup (Doc. 1-946/82). 
9 The adoption of the resolution on arms procurement within a common 
industrial policy and arms sales1 (23 October 1983) was a further signi-
ficant initiative to promote security policy cooperation between Member 
States. 
The calls for the adoption of a common position on security matters and 
for the development of a European security concept were again taken up 
in a resolution on the shared European interests, risks and requirements 
in the security field. 2 This resolution, based on a report drawn up on be-
half of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Klepsch,  3 was adopted by 
the European Parliament on 11  April 1984 by 136 votes to 67 with 8 
abstentions. The report and resolution proved highly significant for the 
future of cooperation on security policy. 
They examined a number of issues, including East-West negotiations on 
arms control, the CSCE follow-up conferences, the role of the European 
Parliament in security policy matters and the relations between the EEC 
and NATO. The resolution also  called on the Political Affairs Com-
mittee of the EP to 'establish a permanent subcommittee on the political 
and economic aspects of security'. When this was then done after the EP 
direct elections in June 1984, one could justly speak of a breakthrough in 
the EP's activity on security policy matters. 
The Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament has 19 members and 
usually meets once a  month.  It has already drawn up  six reports on 
security matters, most of which are now before the parliamentary com-
mittees, namely: 
(a)  arms control and disarmament and their importance to the European 
Community (rapporteur: Sir Peter V  anneck); 
(b)  the  problems  raised  by  chemical  and  biological  weapons  for 
European security (rapporteur: Mrs Piermont); 
(c)  Western European security (rapporteur: Mr Bemard-Reymond); 
(d)  the role of Europe in the defence of the Mediterranean basin (rappor-
teur: Mr Gawronski); 
(e)  the  consequences  for  the  Community  of the  CSCE  and  MCSD 
Conferences (rapporteur: Mr Boesmans); 
I  OJ c 322, 28.11.1983. 
The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Mfairs Committee by Mr 
Fergusson (Doc. 1-455/83). 
2  OJ C 155, 27.6.1983. 
3  Doc. 1-80/84. 
10 (f)  political  aspects  of a  European security strategy (rapporteur:  Mr 
Galluzzi). 
The subcommittee is planning to draw up reports on a number of other 
topics for 1986/87, including (provisionally) aspects of regional secur-
ity, armaments cooperation, the harmonization of national security con-
cepts and the role of Western Europe in disarmament and arms control 
negotiations. 
Apart from its work in drawing up parliamentary reports and motions 
for resolutions, the subcommittee has also been active in other ways, re-
peatedly putting oral questions on security policy cooperation to the For-
eign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and holding hearings of 
experts. The first debate with the Foreign Ministers, on 10 July 1985 in 
Luxembourg,  1 on the basis of an oral question from the subcommittee, 
was a breakthrough. In the resolution winding up the debate, adopted 
on 11 July 1986 by a large majority (105 votes to 43 with 8 abstentions), 
the  Foreign  Ministers  were  called  upon to define  European security 
interests and to represent them in the security policy bodies.  2 
The same concern was also reflected in the plenary debate of the Eu-
ropean Parliament on European security matters in May 1986, which 
examined two oral questions to the Foreign Ministers of the Member 
States.  3 A number of contributors emphasized the need for the EEC to 
regard itself as a security community as well as an economic one, and to 
accept with resolution the commitment to security policy cooperation in 
the framework of EPC as laid down in the Single European Act.  This 
would involve both drawing up a comprehensive disarmament and arms 
control concept which did full justice to European interests and devising 
specific measures to promote armaments cooperation between the Mem-
ber States of the EEC. The resolution adopted by a large majority at the 
end of the debate4 expressed regret at the fact that EPC had not hitherto 
1  d. Oral question tabled by Mr  Poettering and others on behalf of the Subcommittee on Security and 
Disarmament on political and economic aspects of European security (Doc. 82-595185). 
2  d. Resolution  tabled  by  Mr Poettering and  others  on  the political  and  economic  aspects  of 
European security, adopted by Parliament on 11 July 1985 (Doc. 82-632185). 
3  d. (a) Oral question tabled by Mr Toussaint and others on a  European strategic defence  pro-
gramme (Doc. B2-170186 I  0-176185). 
(b) Oral question tabled by Mr Poettering and others on behalf of the Subcommittee on Security 
and Disarmament on political and economic aspects of European security (Doc. B2-171186 I 
0-213186). 
These two questions were the subject of a thorough debate at the plenary sitting of 14 May 1986. 
4  Doc. 82-219186, 15.5.1986. 
11 been capable of pushing ahead with cooperation on security policy in 
order to make Europe's own contribution to peace and disarmament. In 
connection with this, the resolution called on the Foreign Ministers of 
the Twelve meeting in EPC to develop an independent European posi-
tion on the various disarmament initiatives, putting this forward with a 
single voice  as a genuinely European position.  The Subcommittee on 
Security and Disarmament is planning to discuss security problems with 
the Foreign Ministers during each presidency on the basis of oral ques-
tions. 
The public hearing on the situation and prospects of security policy in 
Europe  held  in  December  1985  was  particularly  noteworthy.1  It 
provided an opportunity for intensive dialogue between the members of 
the subcommittee/Political Affairs Committee and eminent experts in 
the field  of security policy and analysis.  The main conclusion arising 
from the speeches and discussions was the need for the European Parlia-
ment to continue to press for a European security policy, so that in fu-
ture European political cooperation is concerned even more closely with 
security matters. This brochure contains the speeches made at this hear-
ing. 
The European Parliament will therefore continue to make every effort to 
assist in spelling out European positions and European proposals for 
maintaining peace. This desire can clearly be seen in the marked increase 
in the number of parliamentary initiatives on security matters since the 
signature of the Single European Act, which provides a new legal basis 
for the examination of security policy issues. Thus following the major 
debate on security policy at the May 1986 part-session, Parliament ex-
pressed  its  views  on security policy,  and during the June 1986 part-
session resolutions on SALT IF and chemical weapons3 were adopted. 
All these initiatives clearly reveal that the examination of economic and 
political aspects of security has become an essential part of the work of 
the European Parliament. This means that much has been achieved, yet 
still more remains to be done. Accordingly, the EP must, in view of the 
numerous security policy challenges of our time, make even greater ef-
forts in future to ensure that its voice is heard. The unambiguous provi-
sions  of the  Single  European  Act  (Title  III,  Article  30(4))  covering 
I  See PE 103.051, 28.1.1986. 
2  Doc. 82-401186 and Doc. 82-416/86, 12.6.1986. 
3  Doc. 82-375/86 and compromise amendment to Docs 82-402 and 82-412/86, 12.6.1986. 
12 ' 
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European political cooperation give grounds for hope that this will be 
possible: the High Contracting Parties 'shall ensure that the views of the 
European Parliament are duly taken into consideration' with regard to 
the foreign policy issues which are being examined within the framework 
of political cooperation. 
Europe must give high priority to assuming greater responsibility for its 
own security. It must become more aware of the possibilities open to it 
for firmly representing its own security interests. It should continue to 
develop this security policy within the NATO framework. In future the 
USA should no longer be obliged to discuss policy individually with each 
European capital. Western Europeans should undertake comprehensive 
joint analyses of all important issues in the field of defence, arms control 
and detente policy,  define  basic principles  and formulate  specific de-
mands and proposals to be  harmonized with  the US  Administration. 
Washington should be able to rely on a Europe speaking with one voice. 
This would make Europe a reliable and predictable, but above all  an 
equal, partner in the field of security policy. NATO, the Western Eu-
ropean Union (WEU) and the European Parliament are not alternative 
fora for a process of emancipation of this type. They should rather have 
a cumulative function, reinforcing one another in the pursuit of a com-
mon goal. 
Political  reinforcement  of the European pillar  of the  North Atlantic 
Alliance would also create a sound 'grand design' for transatlantic part-
nership which the vast majority of the population on both sides of the 
Atlantic could endorse. 
In particular, by speaking with one voice Europe would be able to assert 
its interests vis-a-vis  its ideological and geo-political challenger, the So-
viet Union, more calmly and more consciously. This would also be in the 
Soviet  Union's interests, since Western Europe would become a more 
predictable partner. 
True detente policy would thereby be given a much better cha(lce of suc-
,cess. 
13 ~  The European Parliament's public hearing on security policy in Europe 
(Brussels, 18 and 19 December 1985) 
Hans-Gert Poettering 
Chairman  of the  European  Parlia-
ment's Subcommittee on Security and 
Disarmament 
Jonathan Alford 
Deputy Director, IISS 
Sir Peter V anneck 
Vice-Chainnan of the European Par-
liament's  Subcommittee  on Security 
and Disarmament Statement by Ambassador David M. Abshire 
US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council 
When I arrived at NATO just over two years ago, NATO's most serious 
problems were readily apparent. The gap between the military capabili-
ties of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, especially at the conventional level, 
was widening. As a consequence, the adequacy of flexible response was 
being thrown into question by ongoing trends that suggested the Soviets 
were developing the capability to respond more effectively in a crisis and 
conflict than NATO. Deterrence must rest on a triad of NATO forces-
conventional,  theatre  nuclear  and  strategic  nuclear  - that give  the 
Alliance a variety of possible responses to aggression at the appropriate 
level. 
At the conventional level, NATO's problem is not that it is universally 
weak, but that its strength is  uneven.  There were- and are- some 
weak points in NATO's conventional forces as well as critical shortages. 
Those weaknesses are disturbing, especially in light of Moscow's grow-
ing emphasis on operational manoeuvre groups and other concepts of 
deep penetration. Warning time has been reduced. 
Nuclear power is  blackmail power, but its military utility tends to be 
questionable. This is not true of conventional forces.  They are flexible 
and usable. Furthermore, their use is far more subject to miscalculation 
- an especially dangerous consideration in view of the fact that a future 
major conflict is  likely to begin  at the conventional, not the nuclear, 
level. 
Reducing the vulnerability of NATO forces and giving them requisite 
flexibility,  however,  is  more  expensive  than  ever.  Alliance  nations 
confront a traditional difficulty of harmonizing costly security require-
ments with other important social claims. 
These pressures exacerbate what defence analyst Thomas Callaghan has 
termed NATO's 'structural disarmament' - fewer weapons systems with 
ever  higher unit costs, producing limited readiness, and more limited 
combat capability. 
15 These problems exist at a time when NATO's political strategy has been 
functioning well. The INF consultations, the work of the special con-
sultative  group,  the  links  between  the  Geneva  negotiations  and  the 
North Atlantic Council - all these were a model of  Alliance interaction. 
Through these efforts the Alliance denied the Soviets their goal of split-
ting NATO. 
Once INF deployments began, however, the concern arose that the INF 
burden was being used by some as an argument, and an excuse, not to 
look at conventional defence problems. Meanwhile, important members 
of the US Congress were growing increasingly frustrated over NATO's 
inability or unwillingness to confront those problems.  Some,  such  as 
long-time NATO supporter Senator Sam Nunn, complained that NATO 
did not have flexible  response but an extended trip-wire, that nuclear 
risks were being kept too high. 
Many conventional defence problems could be solved by more money. 
However, the Alliance is not providing the necessary resources, as many 
of the allies  fall  short of the goal of 3  °/o  annual increases in defence 
spending. Furthermore, the Alliance has been investing as much in de-
fence as the Warsaw Pact and getting less output for that investment. 
In the last 18  months, the Alliance has focused  detailed attention on 
conventional defence needs and has recognized the requirement for a re-
sources strategy. The concept of a resources strategy has featured as an 
important element in the last two defence ministerial communiques. 
It is ironic that NATO had lost sight of the concept of strategy as a way 
to marshal and manage resources for the achievement of specific goals. 
Business schools have adopted such a concept of strategy; development 
economics have incorporated it; even sports teams talk about it. These 
ideas all came from a concept that was originally military. NATO, how-
ever, did not have a strategy for the effective use of its resources, and the 
lack of a resources strategy put its military strategy, even its deterrent 
strategy, at risk. 
Recently, NATO has moved aggressively to put the framework for such 
a strategy in place. The goal of NATO's resources strategy is simple: to 
improve NATO's conventional defence effectiveness,  and to do so by 
getting improved output for  our investment,  whether dollar, pound, 
mark, franc, guilder, etc. This is a classical approach to strategy dealing 
with the harmonization of means and ends. 
16 NATO's resources strategy should not be viewed as a stereotyped plan, 
like the Schlieffen Plan or the US industrial mobilization plan of 1940. It 
is, above all, an attitude and an approach that examines creatively all 
trade-offs,  multiplier  effects,  investment  advantages  and  incentives, 
and all basic resources that are available to NATO for bolstering its de-
terrent such as emerging technology and highly trained manpower (both 
civilian and military). It emphasizes long-range, integrative thinking and 
integrates  and  harmonizes  categories  that  are  normally  isolated, 
truncated, or compartmentalized. Finally, it stresses raising key issues to 
the political level  where hard choices  and difficult trade-offs must be 
made. 
THE ELEMENTS OF A RESOURCES STRATEGY 
1. The conceptual military framework 
The starting point of NATO's resources strategy is having a central con-
cept of what must be done. In the past, NATO's planning horizon has 
been relatively short-term, 5 to 8 years or so. As a consequence, when 
creative ideas emerged, new technologies became available, and novel 
operational concepts were advanced, NATO was not fully equipped to 
capitalize on their potential. West German Defence Minister Manfred 
Woerner expressed his frustration with this problem when he felt bar-
raged by a host of new ideas- airland battle, follow-on forces attack, 
emerging technologies and others.  How did all  of these things fit  to-
gether? Woerner asked.  How did they relate to what  NATO was al-
ready doing? Clearly, NATO needed a better intellectual and conceptual 
framework to guide NATO's thinking, direct its planning, and discipline 
its resources management. 
NATO's defence  ministers  charged the Military Committee, together 
with  the major commanders, to respond to Minister Woerner's chal-
lenge. The committee and Supreme Allied Commander General Bernard 
Rogers have done so with a bold, innovative approach looking 15-20 
years into the future. Their conceptual military framework is designed to 
discipline  NATO's military thinking,  tactics,  and technologies to the 
battlefield of the 1990s and beyond. 
That conceptual military framework for the 1990s became the first ele-
ment, the core, of what I call a resources strategy. 
17 The  conceptual  military  framework  defines  the  tasks  required  of 
Alliance forces.  Their definition - and agreement by ministers as  to 
their importance - provides the base from which NATO's efforts to 
maximize the impact of Alliance resources can begin. NATO's first re-
quirement is defeat of the lead echelon of the attacking force. This is at 
the heart of NATO's concept of forward defence.  However, it is  not 
enough.  There must also  be  the capacity to attack follow-on  forces, 
control the sea and air, project maritime power, protect allied shipping, 
and safeguard rear areas. 
2. The estimate: NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact 
In order to know whether NATO can really do the things that the con-
ceptual military framework calls for, the Alliance must also determine 
how it  stacks  up  against  the  potential  adversary.  Thus,  a  dynamic 
estimate of the military balance is the second element of the recources 
strategy. 
Based on a variety of NATO assessments, allies - at the ambassadorial 
and ministerial level - have reached agreement on a better estimate of 
the threat. Clearly, NATO's ability to perform the vital tasks defined in 
the  conceptual  military  framework  is,  in  some  areas  at least,  ques-
tionable. 
NATO's assessment does not play down the magnitude of the problem, 
as some estimates have done in the past. Moreover, the allies have reali-
zed that if NATO is to have an effective resources strategy, it does little 
good to generalize about the threat. Therefore, allies have focused on 
specific problems in order to solve them. 
3. Critical deficiencies 
A major part of NATO's efforts over the last six years has been to de-
termine its critical deficiencies in very specific terms. This is  the third 
component of my resources strategy. Among the most serious problems 
are: 
NATO's shortfall in standing ground forces provides the Alliance with 
only a limited ability to prevent a breakthrough. This shortcoming exa-
cerbates the old Alliance problem of  depending on adequate warning and 
the question of how the Alliance will respond to ambiguous warnings. 
There are too many differences in the levels of  training, equipment, man-
ning and availability of mobilizable reserve forces. Some are simply not 
18 adequate to the task. Nor does NATO have effective enough means to 
defeat, disrupt or destroy the enemy's reserves. 
There are serious deficiencies in the numbers of suitable aircraft, modern 
munitions,  and supporting systems  for  effective  offensive  counter air 
operations. Moreover, a favourable air situation depends on early re-
inforcement, and NATO has not had sufficient infrastructure to receive 
the airplanes and support coming from the United States. Furthermore, 
NATO would find it difficult to distinguish between friendly and hostile 
aircraft. 
The capabilities of  Portugal, Greece and Turkey are another serious defi-
ciency. 
In the maritime area, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and mine 
countermeasures are the most critical problems. 
Finally, the Alliance does not have enough stocks of simple, but essential 
things, such as ammunition and petrol. NATO must work toward a 30-
day war reserve stock in such critical commodities. 
A unique problem, which some people would not include in a list of con-
ventional shortcomings, is chemical warfare and an effective deterrent to 
the use  of chemical weapons.  In the absence of a comprehensive and 
verifiable ban on chemical weapons to which NATO is fully committed, 
NATO forces under attack would face the very real probability of having 
to conduct conventional combat operations in a chemical environment. 
NATO forces  are thus ill  prepared and equipped to survive  and sus-
tain  operations  should  the  Warsaw  Pact  initiate  chemical  warfare. 
NATO needs not only good defensive chemical capabilities, but also a 
chemical deterrent. Today, with no deterrent in kind for preventing the 
use of chemical weapons, NATO would have to consider a nuclear re-
sponse to a chemical attack. At a time when all of  NATO's efforts are de-
signed to push back as  far  as  possible the moment at which nuclear 
weapons would be called for, this situation is unacceptable. 
Earlier this year NATO achieved consensus agreement on these areas as 
needing immediate attention. The Alliance knows what its problems are. 
The question is: what does NATO do about them? 
Already there have been some concrete results. At the December 1984 
ministerial meeting infrastructure funding was doubled. That decision 
will enable NATO to take care of 90°/o  of the minimum operational re-
quirements and 70% of the shelters needed to protect aircraft reinforce-
19 ments coming from North America.  Ministers also  agreed to expand 
critical ammunition stocks. The agreement between Secretary of Defence 
Weinberger and Defence Minister Woerner on a system for the identi-
fication of friends and foes  represents an important move in the resol-
ution of that problem. 
4. Goals, priorities and planning 
Better planning is the link between knowing critical problems and taking 
effective action to resolve them. It is the fourth element of my resources 
strategy. Above all, it means better linkage between NATO and national 
planning. 
Efforts to improve NATO planning were intensified at the spring 1985 
defence ministers meeting in Brussels. Ministers adopted comprehensive 
recommendations constituting a plan of action for the Alliance.  They 
agreed  to give  special emphasis to deficiencies,  both in national  and 
Alliance planning. 
Of course, while giving special emphasis to key deficiencies, nations and 
the Alliance must continue to maintain adequate capabilities in other 
areas.  NATO cannot allow additional deficiencies to develop.  Conse-
quently, ministers also issued the 19  85 ministerial guidance, NATO's 
major political directive, which, in particular, gives direction for the pre-
paration of NATO's force goals. 
At this stage, NATO's action plan is essentially a plan for an action plan. 
Devising specific remedial actions and then implementing them requires 
imagination and considerable political determination. Some tough ques-
tions lie ahead, but there are also opportunities. Exploiting those op-
portunities is the next important step in the resources strategy. 
5. Coalition solutions for coalition problems 
As an alliance, NATO must think about fighting, working, and planning 
as a coalition. Of course, NATO would prefer not to fight, but to deter. 
Deterrence, however, is also a coalition demand. Coalition solutions for 
coalition problems is the fifth component of my resources strategy. 
An effective coalition is not just the sum of individual nations planning, 
programming,  budgeting,  provisioning,  training  and  commanding. 
Rather, it is- all of the allies doing those things together so that a synergy 
among their efforts is created, and the whole becomes greater than the 
sum of the parts. 
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NATO airborne early warning and control programme. Thirteen mem-
bers of the then-fifteen national alliance joined together to acquire an ad-
vanced surveillance, detection and command/  control capability for air 
defence operations. The allies bought the system and delivered the air-
craft  together,  and  are  flying  them  with  multinational  flight  and 
maintenance crews from what in all aspects is a NATO airbase at Geilen-
kirchen, West Germany. This exceptional programme came together be-
cause allies put Alliance needs for air defence and  political solidarity 
above purely nationalistic demands. 
While common funding might be the best approach for the large, ex-
pensive requirements, other approaches should not be ruled out to meet 
other  needs.  Another  coalition  approach,  for  example,  is  common 
production. Perhaps the consolidated European production of the imag-
ing infra-red maverick and the multiple launch rocket system will be-
come excellent examples of collaborative production. 
Another example could be  a European initiative to develop a modem 
automated facility for the production of ammunition. Today several Eu-
ropean nations are producing their own rounds at decidedly different 
prices for the same round. Yet, ammunition shortages remain NATO's 
most dramatic deficiency. If the Europeans joined together, exploiting 
advances in robotics and other technologies, they could greatly increase 
their efficiency and provide a significantly enhanced wartime production 
surge capability and mobilization potential. 
Another approach toward coalition solutions is  specialization.  NATO 
already has specialization to a certain degree in the maritime field where 
the United States and Britain provide blue-water capabilities and other 
allies concentrate on shallow-water tasks.  Under budgetary pressures, 
however, the Alliance may be moving toward a kind of de facto special-
ization as individual allies decide that they can no longer afford to as-
sume particular roles or missions. 
Rather than specialization by default, NATO must examine possibilities 
for specialization systematically and exploit each ally's 'comp~rative ad-
vantage'. There is also a synergy between specialization in military roles 
and specialization of industrial capability. NATO should take a look at 
the positive benefits in that direction. 
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Technology is one of the West's greatest assets, and effective technology 
management is the sixth element of my resources strategy. It would be a 
poor strategy that did not exploit technology to the maximum.  Un-
fortunately, NATO has not. 
NATO has neither protected its technology adequately nor shared it ef-
fectively.  There are a myriad of examples of the rather poor record in 
leaking technology to the East. The flow of vital Western technology to 
the East that aids the Soviets in their military build-up in turn forces 
NATO to take more expensive measures in response. That is hardly an 
effective use of resources. 
Equally,  NATO may  also  be  paying  a  price  if an  overemphasis  on 
protection prevents allies appropriately sharing technology. Severely re-
stricting technology sharing reduces the rate at which the West can in-
corporate beneficial technology into operational systems on the battle-
field  on an Alliance-wide  basis.  That, too, is  not effective  resources 
strategy. 
It is imperative, therefore, to harmonize technology protection and tech-
nology sharing. 
The job, however, does not end there. NATO must also exploit new 
technologies more effectively.  First, relatively mature technology must 
be introduced into the battlefield as effectively as possible. Through Sec-
retary of Defence  Weinberger's emerging technologies  initiative three 
years ago, NATO is examining how to do that. It has identified a group 
of 16 projects in areas such as  standoff weapons, battlefield and rear 
echelon surveillance capability, and a NATO identification system. The 
goal of this effort is to determine how NATO, on a joint basis, can ex-
peditiously  incorporate  these  high-leverage  systems  and technologies 
into Alliance inventories. 
The second task is to look farther into the future. NATO has a mandate 
from its ministers to examine technologies at the leading edge of science 
-bio-technology, artificial intelligence, and many more- in order to 
determine how these technologies can help meet expected needs beyond 
the year 2000. The goal is to put together cooperative ventures in bring-
ing these technologies to a level of maturity so that, in 5 to 15 years, 
NATO could use them in future weapons development. 
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An important area that combines coalition solutions and effective tech-
nology management is  armaments cooperation, the seventh element of 
my resources strategy. 
Armaments cooperation has been recognized as perhaps the best long-
term way to insure  better resource  use.  The United States executive 
branch has moved remarkably to get its house in order. It began with 
Secretary Weinberger's strong commitments at the December 1983 mini-
sterial meeting and crystallized in his memorandum to all elements in the 
Pentagon in which he describes the US goal as 'greater integration of mi-
litary requirements with Alliance-wide defence industrial cooperation'. A 
Defence Department steering group has been formed, under the chair-
manship of Deputy Secretary of Defence Taft, whose goal is to promote 
more allied arms cooperation. 
Congress has become a partner in this effort.  Last year Congressman 
Sam Stratton introduced legislation in the House and this year Senator 
Quayle introduced it in the Senate that will help cut through some of the 
bureaucratic  red  tape  when  cooperative  armaments  projects  are  in-
volved. Moreover, recent legislation introduced by Senators Sam Nunn, 
John Warner, and William Roth represents a further critical opportunity 
for the Alliance. 
THE NEW 'NUNN AMENDMENT' 
One year ago, Senator Nunn offered an amendment that threatened the 
withdrawal of American forces from Europe if NATO did not improve 
its  conventional  defence.  That amendment was  a  measure  of Senate 
frustration with the Alliance and Capitol Hill's perception of NATO's 
unwillingness to meet fundamental responsibilities. When Senator Nunn 
visited NATO last March, he was impressed by the turnaround in its at-
titude and the commitment to solving its problems. That visit prompted 
him to offer an amendment that fences off USD 50 million for each of  the 
American armed services to be used only for collaborative projects. An-
other USD  50 million will be used for side-by-side competitive testing 
between American and European systems. 
The importance of the amendment is not just the money; it is the prece-
dent.  It is  part of our resources  strategy of producing incentives  for 
better Alliance-wide resource use. 
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America's  military  services  to  collaborate  at  an  early  point  in  the 
weapons development process. Examples of what the services could do 
include  initiating  cooperative  research  programmes  on high-leverage 
technologies  such  as  remote  sensors  and computer software, sharing 
costs for feasibility studies of the most promising joint projects, or parti-
cipating beyond the feasibility study in the NATO frigate replacement 
programme. 
While the US  military was one of Congress's targets, Europe was an-
other.  NATO's European members must consider pooling their indi-
vidual national resources to collaborate with the United States. Such a 
development would encourage both greater rationalization of Europe's 
technological capabilities and more efficient use of its resources. 
In Europe, progress has been slower toward getting its house in order. 
There is still too much duplication: 
(a) 11 firms in 7 Alliance countries building anti-tank weapons; 
(b) 18  firms  in  7  countries  designing  and  producing  ground-to-air 
weapons; 
(c)  16 companies in 7 countries working on air-to-ground weapons. 
There is too much nationalism. A recent Financial Times editorial asked 
whether the European fighter aircraft would become a 'political aircraft'. 
An  unhappy compromise in which the overriding aim will  not be  to 
satisfy military requirements, but to meet the aspirations of national de-
fence lobbies. This question captures the dynamic all too often at work 
in the NATO procurement process. 
There  is  not  enough  collaboration.  Collaboration,  if  managed  effi-
ciently,  can  yield  substantial  economies.  An  example  was  recently 
pointed out by former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral 
Wesley  McDonald.  Admiral McDonald said that the development of 
NATO's proposed frigate for the 1990s, now in the design stage, would 
increase naval standardization and result in lower building costs. If  this 
project is brought to fruition, NATO could build as many as 125 frigates 
for the price of about 100 that could be built otherwise. Despite these 
problems, things at NATO are changing. Secretary General Carrington 
is committed to getting action. NATO has begun a re-examination of  the 
arms cooperation process to decide whether the conference of national 
armaments directors is doing its business as effectively as possible, how 
the process can be improved, and where important changes could be 
made. 
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specific projects as  candidates for intensified collaboration. NATO is 
planning a special meeting ·of the North Atlantic Council reinforced by 
deputy defence ministers to focus solely on enhancing the arms coopera-
tion progress.  This reinforced NAC will be similar to the one held in 
mid-November, the first of its kind since 1950. 
Developments  within  the  Independent  European  Programme  Group 
(IEPG) are another positive sign. The IEPG's recent Chairman, Dutch 
State Secretary Jan Van Houwelingen, has made the group a real player 
in the armaments cooperation area. No one believed the IEPG would 
ever meet at the ministerial level, but IEPG defence ministers completed 
their  second  meeting  in  June  1985  and  have  additional  meetings 
scheduled. 
In the long term, will Europe respond to enhanced arms cooperation? 
Or will politics and national economic interests get in the way? Will the 
fear of European politicians over jobs and national market shares show 
that nothing is really changed? 
The US  Congress is watching and waiting. If the Alliance does not re-
spond to the challenge and the opportunity that has been presented, we 
will  have another punitive amendment. I am convinced that the next 
time such an amendment is offered, it would easily pass the Congress if 
led by someone like Senator Nunn. 
8. Economics and security 
The eighth component of my resources strategy is a better understanding 
of the relationship between economics and security.  Europe's general 
economic situation makes its resource choices more difficult. European 
decision-makers  are faced  with unemployment, sluggish  job creation, 
slow  growth,  disaggregated  markets,  an  inadequate  high  technology 
sector, and extremely demanding social welfare burdens. 
A strong economy is  a prerequisite for a strong defence, and Europe's 
lagging economic recovery and its basic structural economic problems 
are impediments to increasing defence expenditures. A high technology 
gap is developing between the USA and Japan on one side, and Europe 
on the other. The problem is not so much Europe's basic science or its 
technological creativity.  Rather, it is  Europe's inability to organize its 
technological  resources  efficiently.  Of course,  any  such  organization 
must be on a non-protectionist basis. 
25 PARTNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP 
If Europe  is  to  experience  both  sustained  economic  growth  and 
enhanced security, the governments of all Alliance members must make 
tough decisions. Perhaps those decisions will be easier if those making 
them realize that one of their greatest advantages is  the strength and 
cohesion that derives from membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Partner-
ship and leadership, then, are the last elements in the resources strategy. 
We must do the job together, not just those of us whose daily business is 
Alliance security- in defence ministries, foreign ministries, or foreign 
policy research institutes. I also mean finance and trade ministries; legis-
lators throughout the Alliance have an important role, but for that they 
need to know what NATO is doing and the progress we have made. To 
generate the fundamental public support that will ultimately determine 
our success or failure, we have to get NATO's story to NATO's people. 
Those of us at NATO intend to demonstrate that we are better stewards 
of our resources than we have been in the past. In doing so, we can then, 
justifiably, ask for the additional resources we will need in the future. 
We can also rebuild the defence consensus on a bipartisan, indeed multi-
partisan basis. NATO has new ideas, a process for implementing them, 
an emerging resources strategy, and momentum. We cannot let up. 
*  * 
In reply  to questions put by Sir  Peter Vanneck (ED,  UK),  Mr Bernard-Rey-
mond (EPP, F)  and Sir James Scott-Hopkins (ED, UK), Mr Abshire said that 
there had been a dramatic change in the attitude of Europeans to the conven-
tional  defence  of Europe.t  This  helped  to  counter  protectionist  trends  in 
Congress; transatlantic deals between private firms were very numerous. 
Mr Abshire  did  not think that Western  European  Union  (WEU)  undercut 
NATO:  while the North Atlantic Council  did  not want an alternative arms 
control forum, suspicions of WEU had not been fulfilled. 
The Rogers Plan concerned resources strategy and high technology. The 1985 
Nunn amendment would help to develop coordinated systems to counter the dif-
1  Abbreviations used to denote political groups - Socialist:  Soc.; European People's Party:  EPP; 
European Democrat: ED; Communist and Allies: Comm.; Liberal and Democratic Reformist: Lib.; 
European Democratic Alliance: EDA; European Right: ER; Rainbow: Arc. 
26 ficult situation in the 1990s created by a Soviet build-up, reduced warning times 
and the slow rate of NATO reinforcement. 
Mr Abshire  believed  that joint arms procurement could only be  achieved  at 
political level; for example NATO Defence Ministers were now meeting in the 
North Atlantic Council to discuss joint procurement. 
Responding to questions put by Mr Romualdi (ER, 1), Mr Newens (Soc., UK) 
and Mrs Piermont (Arc., FRG), Mr Abshire said that the Soviet Union had re-
jected the doctrine of  Mutual Assured Destruction. Europe had been unwilling to 
provide sufficient conventional forces to defend itself and the US  nuclear um-
brella had thus become essential. This in turn aggravated the US budget deficit. 
27 Statement by General Gerd Schmiickle 
Federal Republic of Germany 
My subject, 'Conditions and prospects for European security', brings me 
immediately to the Geneva Summit organized jointly by General Sec-
retary Gorbachev and President Reagan in November 1986. I should like 
to make a comment on this as a European: at a 'summit' 30 years ago the 
representatives of Great Britain and France would still have been sitting 
round the superpowers' table. On this occasion Europe was not offered a 
seat. It had no voice in Geneva. It was not even referred to, either in the 
press conferences or in the 'joint declaration' published by Reagan and 
Gorbachev. There was no president of a 'United States of  Europe' present 
at the negotiating table. 
We are all quite well aware that the history of summit meetings over the 
last 50 years has been nothing more than a series of misunderstandings 
and it has been Europe which has had to pay the price.  The Geneva 
meeting once again did nothing more than confirm our dependence on 
the two superpowers, and particularly our dependence in security mat-
ters. All the passages which are of some political significance in the two 
statesmen's joint declaration deal with security matters, and this includes 
our security. There was a high pressure Soviet media campaign in Gen-
eva  which  started with  a  press  conference given  by  Colonel  General 
Chervov. It had a single objective: to bring the American defence initia-
tive, SDI, to a halt. It failed. Now, after Geneva, there is a new wave of 
Soviet information activity in the West. They are trying to do now what 
they did not manage in Geneva, namely to get rid of SDI.  Soviet em-
bassies  are sending out brochures attacking SDI  in English, German, 
French and Italian - and the target is  clear.  Soviet pressure directed 
against Western security measures is nothing new. For the purposes of 
our subject, it is important to remember that the West is refused similar 
opportunities in the East. It is thus a one-way effort to bring influence to 
bear, to turn people in the West against the West's own security meas-
ures. This is the price which an open society has to pay and something 
with which it must learn to live. 
What positive good did Geneva achieve? First of all, a written statement 
in  the 'joint declaration' that a  nuclear war between the two world 
28 powers cannot be won. This is not any great novelty. However, that the 
two most powerful men in the world should have together put this down 
in writing for the first time is something new. It also contradicts previous 
Soviet military doctrine which saw, and still does see, atomic weapons as 
instruments of victory.  If Gorbachev  does  intend to  break with  this 
doctrine, this is  an important step forward towards preventing war in 
Europe. 
A second important passage in the 'joint declaration' emphasizes that 
neither side is  seeking military superiority. This too is  new because it 
means Soviet recognition of the principle of the balance of power. A mi-
litary balance is not, however, compatible with Soviet thinking on secur-
ity matters over the past few decades. For what are, partly, quite under-
standable reasons, Moscow has been  seeking  military superiority.  Of 
course, Brezhnev used to speak about balance, as we know, but his ac-
tions, in building up his arsenal of SS 20s, were in blatant breach of this 
principle. Is there a real change in Soviet thinking on security now taking 
place under Gorbachev? 
The final important point in the joint declaration was the news that ef-
forts were to be made to prevent armament in space, to limit or to end it 
on Earth and to reduce atomic weapons. These phrases signify a willing-
ness to bring the process of armament under control. The arms race is, of 
course, partly an expression of two rival political systems.  And Gor-
bachev left no one in doubt during his press conference that this rivalry 
would continue. One may conclude from this with all due caution that 
the Soviet statesman is aiming to calm the military situation without de-
fusing the rivalry between the systems. This is probably as far as Gor-
bachev  could go,  given  the domestic  situation in  the  USSR  and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
The armament dialectic: Over the past 40 years there has been a dialectic 
on armaments between East and West. It is present in three main areas: 
naval weapons, nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. This dia-
lectic conditions European security. 
Naval armament: The Soviets have succeeded with an impressive feat of 
strength in turning a kind of coastguard into an instrument of global 
maritime power within the space of 25 years - presumably partly as a 
reaction  to Kruschev's defeat in the Cuba crisis, for, at that time, the 
originator of the crisis lacked the high seas fleet  with which he could 
have  seen  through his  game of poker.  This new superpower navy is 
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than a decade, it has been practising how, in the event of war, it could 
prevent reinforcement coming into Europe from overseas. 
We can still deal with this threat today, should the need arise. And yet 
even today Western navies would receive a bloody nose.  Whether the 
situation will still be the same in 10 or 20 years' time, no one can predict. 
But one thing will still be certain: Western Europe could not withstand a 
crisis without overseas reinforcements and Western Europeans cannot 
protect these reinforcements without the aid of the American fleet. The 
relative size of European navies has fallen to a lower level than has ever 
been the case before in the history of Europe. In other words: in naval 
terms we have become dependent on the two superpowers to a degree 
never known before. 
At regular intervals the Soviet fleet  establishes a naval corridor in the 
North Sea which is intended to impress and which is indeed impressive. 
These exercises are intended to extend the Soviet naval glacis westwards 
in order to be able to send their submarines out from there into the At-
lantic.  In  actual  fact,  for  all  its  strength,  their  navy  does  have  a 
dangerous weakness:  its  shore bases  are inadequate in relation to its 
worldwide mission. Some of it lies behind the North Cape, while other 
fleets  are hemmed in in the Baltic and the Black Seas.  Moscow would 
have a difficult job to bring these three fleets together in time of war. 
Western experts fear as a result that the Soviet navy could take Soviet 
foreign  policy in tow to be  on the outlook for better harbours in the 
West. If  it were to gain a single large base on the Atlantic, its political im-
portance would increase many times over. 
Be that as it may, Soviet naval policy, which also takes in its merchant 
fleet,  is  a worry to the West. Its creator, Admiral Gorschkow, always 
wanted a navy of the offensive kind. The admiral, whose genius cannot 
be denied, is  now to be  replaced.  It remains to be  seen whether Gor-
bachev can impose a new naval policy and how the Russian admiralty 
will react. Whatever happens now, the Soviet fleet has inescapably be-
come  one of the factors  conditioning European security,  but what is 
equally certain is that it is swallowing up huge financial resources for its 
construction and expansion. Whatever view one takes of this, the build-
ing up of this fleet is one of the most amazing events of modern times. 
With breathtaking speed Russia, traditionally a continental power, has 
turned itself into a worldwide sea power. 
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ridor in the North Sea  and the Atlantic at equally regular intervals. It 
reacts to each large-scale Soviet exercise by organizing its own mammoth 
manreuvres in the same region. Each side tries to outdo the other and 
thus, over the last decade, a dialectic of naval forces has arisen around 
the coast of Europe, the like of which has never been seen before. 
Atomic weapons: The dialectic which arose between the construction of 
the SS 20 arsenal and the subsequent Western armament programme is a 
familiar one. What is less well-known in Europe is that the Americans 
today consider their land- and air-based second strike ability to be in jeo-
pardy.  The  accurate  Soviet  SS  18  and  SS  19  missiles  are  causing 
American experts to fear that their own long-range missiles could fall 
victim to a surprise attack and they would be denied the possibility of 
mounting an adequate counter-attack. At the same time Soviet air de-
fence  has been disposed in such depth that an American air counter-
attack could be  ineffective.  These are America's  concerns,  for  which 
opinions about facts  are - as  ever - more important than the facts 
themselves. 
It is interesting in retrospect to see that the Americans managed to get the 
ABM Treaty through in 1972, drastically limiting anti-missile defence, 
only in the face of considerable Soviet scepticism. Soviet representatives 
were reported to have said:  'How are we supposed to explain to our 
people we are no longer permitted to defend them?' The signing of this 
Treaty established  the  policy  of 'mutually  assured  destruction'.  The 
Americans supposed before its adoption, that the Soviets would also ex-
ercise  restraint in  future  with regard to offensive  missiles.  They even 
added a unilateral declaration to the Treaty in which it was stated that 
the nuclear potentials would be reduced. This was self-deception. Today 
the Soviets have almost six times as many nuclear warheads which could 
be used against American atomic missile sites as the US negotiators had 
accepted in 1982. 
What has happened since the ABM Treaty? Let me give a few rough fig-
ures. The Americans have reduced the number of  their nuclear warheads 
from  28 000 to 26 000 but increased their destructive potential from 
some 4 000 to 4 200 megatons TNT. They have enormously improved 
the accuracy of  their missiles, which is as good as further increasing their 
destructive potential. Since the ABM Treaty the Soviets have increased 
the number of their warheads from  some  10 000 to 25 000 and in-
creased their destructive potential from 4 000 to 9 000 megatons TNT. 
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end of this decade.  This more or less is  the result of the ABM Treaty 
slightly more than a decade after its signing. 
As far as this nuclear destructive potential is concerned, of course every 
State has the right and the duty to defend itself against an attacker. How-
ever, no government can be granted the right to blow up our planet in a 
war.  New ways must therefore be sought to supersede maximum de-
terrence. To avoid any misunderstanding: deterrence is still today the de-
cisive  factor in ensuring peace in Europe and between the two world 
powers. It has meant - for the first time in human history - that war 
has been ruled out as a means of pursuing policy. This pax atomica has, 
it is true, not created an ideal peace but it has created a zone of peace in 
America,  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  which  has  enjoyed  greater 
prosperity than other regions of the globe. Thanks to this change in the 
thinking of politicians, diplomats and soldiers, Europe has been pre-
served from war, and that is the positive side of the deterrence policy. It 
is something to be valued highly. 
Now Gorbachev and Reagan have indicated in Geneva that they want to 
reduce their nuclear potential. Encouraging though this may be, we Eu-
ropeans do not need to be grateful to the superpowers, since it is nothing 
more than the final redeeming of an obligation existing under the Non-
proliferation Treaty. The European signatories of this Treaty have re-
spected it, but the two world powers have not. If  they were really tore-
duce their nuclear arsenals, then they would be doing no more than what 
they have for a long time been obliged to do. 
Of course, the negotiations on arms control undertaken so far do not 
provide grounds for  any great hopes.  Naturally the nuclear potential 
could be reduced by half on both sides and the policy of  mutually assured 
destruction would remain intact. And yet it is perhaps in the essence of 
this policy that neither side will trust the other to exercise restraint. It 
was this factor which led in the first place to the quantitative and then to 
a qualitative nuclear arms race. 
Conventional weapons: This dialectic too is a familiar one: the West has 
matched Soviet superiority with higher quality. Policy on conventional 
armaments has followed a straightforward series: 'Mark 1' is succeeded 
by an improved 'Mark 2', and after this there comes in turn an even more 
perfect 'Mark 3'. This was and is the rather unimaginative plan for arma-
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to agree. Too much importance was placed on weapon systems suitable 
for an attack or a counter-attack, both in the East and in the West. This 
had nothing to do with governments' willingness to mount an attack, but 
with habitual ways of thinking. In earlier times wars were waged out of a 
thirst for glory or greed for land and always in the expectation that one's 
own position would be improved after the war. For this weapons were 
needed which were suitable for attack. Now these factors no longer hold 
true in Europe. And yet the conventional arms planners still carry this 
baggage  from  the  past around with  them.  Nevertheless,  the war in 
Europe  foretold  by  the  prophets  of doom  has  not yet  broken  out. 
Conventional weapons have become elements of deterrence without, it is 
true, being designed with this, their true task in view. 
Prospects for European security: Our European security too will be deci-
ded by what Reagan and Gorbachev can make out of their Geneva Sum-
mit. Are they strong enough to hold the desired course in the face of their 
power establishments? Probably this will be  an especially difficult task 
for Gorbachev since he has to overcome opposition from many quarters 
at home, alter established military doctrines and stimulate new political 
thinking. 
By comparison the US President has an easier job. He too is attempting 
to break through established modes of thinking.  Through his SDI de-
fence initiative he is having research undertaken into new possibilities for 
security. Should they be feasible, they will have a profound effect on Eu-
ropean security. It is difficult to imagine that, if the superpowers were to 
give  up the strategy of deterrence they have  followed  so  far,  Europe 
would cling to its own. It is generally known that Reagan hopes that it 
will be possible firstly to reduce the offensive danger of nuclear missiles 
by technological means, secondly, then to reduce the number of these 
'sword' weapons drastically, thirdly to share the results of SD I research 
with the Soviets, fourthly to gradually transform the policy of 'mutually 
assured destruction' into one of 'mutually assured security'. 
The Soviets immediately rejected this idea, even though before conclud-
ing the ABM Treaty they had been thinking along the same lines. Thus 
on this point the Soviets and Americans had exchanged places. This is 
however far from being the last word: either in Moscow or Washington. 
In Geneva Soviet representatives insisted the SDI would not work. Why 
then should it be dangerous? And why are the Soviets maintaining- in 
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Moscow  at  great  expense?  Moscow  will  not  be  protected  against 
American  long-range  missiles  by  a  Potemkin  defence  system!  Fur-
thermore it ought to be amusing for the Soviet Government to see Amer-
ica spending so much money on so much useless stuff like SDI. No, none 
of this could be the reason for their rejection. Not even the charge that 
SD I would lead to a new arms race since the old one is still in full swing 
without any end being at present in sight. One might rather suspect that 
the Soviets do not want to grant their American rivals something they al-
ready possess themselves and can research into further. This is not for-
bidden in politics. It is rather one of the finest diplomatic victories suc-
cessfully to dissuade the other party from something which one intends 
to have oneself. 
The European reaction was not any less sceptical even if it was not so 
blunt as the Soviet rejection. There was a reversal of  ideas in Europe too: 
those who had previously decried the policy of  mutually assured destruc-
tion now wanted to have it retained. A missile defence system could not 
work 100%, it was said. But that had never been suggested by SDI apo-
logists. They wanted rather to find out how high the percentage of inter-
ceptible missiles had to be in order to make it financially impossible for 
an opponent to build up an offensive missile ability against it. The objec-
tive of the research work is  to make defence systems cheaper in price 
than offensive missiles can be.  So  far nobody knows whether this will 
succeed and whether a policy of mutually assured destruction could in 
fact be replaced by a better policy equally able to maintain the peace .  . 
It is  highly probable that the results yielded by American research will 
have a considerable bearing on Europe's defence capability. But the na-
ture of this defence is something we Europeans must decide on for our-
selves. We are under threat from quite different weapons than the North 
Americans. Only the overseas troops are in the same boat as ourselves as 
far as this threat is concerned. What concerns all of us in the first place 
are the weapons which are particularly suited for an offensive in Europe 
such  as  tanks,  combat aircraft,  submarines  and missiles  up to inter-
mediate range. 
Instead of moaning about American SDI, it would be more sensible for 
us to begin research in good time which could lead to a E  uro-American 
SDI.  We  must  technologically  strengthen  the  defence  against  those 
weapons which could support an offensive in such a way that we too 
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this process has begun within the two world powers. In other words, de-
fence must be turned technologically into the stronger form of combat, 
in such a convincing way that it will make any attack in Europe seem 
senseless. This armament process would have to be introduced on both 
sides - in West and East. Then the relationship between weapons suited 
principally for defence and those suited principally for attack would take 
on a new decisive importance - and would be brought into the negotia-
tions on arms control. It  would be important that - as in America - the 
European defence  system  should also  become  cheaper than offensive 
weapons.  In  such  a  case,  those who armed themselves  for  offensive 
purposes  would  be  mis-arming  themselves  in  political,  military  and 
economic terms. 
What matters therefore is to adapt Reagan's basic idea for use in Europe. 
The American President has formulated a sensational new approach in 
this connection: to share his research results with the Soviets in such a 
way that neither side should fall into a position of weakness during the 
conversion process. In Europe this idea is usually not discussed or not 
taken seriously. Of course it would be wrong to conceive of a European 
SDI in contrast to the American defence initiative. There should rather be 
Euro-American cooperation at this stage on devising and developing the 
concept.  Otherwise the cohesion of the alliance could suffer.  The Eu-
ropean section of this scheme would probably be technically easier to set 
up than the complicated American section. The technological progress 
which has been made in the last 10 years in sensors, computers, lasers 
and other developments would enable the European section to get going 
relatively quickly. It is true it would require political courage and energy 
to pursue such a programme in a consistent manner. The military and in-
dustrial lobbies would have to be  resisted,  as  would the pressure for 
awarding arms contracts in accordance with constituency interests. 
President Reagan has given  evidence  that he  has this courage, in his 
dealings with the Soviet General Secretary as elsewhere. That Gorbachev 
did not insist in Geneva that SDI should be abolished before there could 
be any further talks, shows political sense. Apparently he  has a better 
understanding of the American vision than the Soviet propagandists who 
were still  talking in Geneva in  the same old tone.  He also  knows of 
course what a great research effort is going on in his own country to en-
able a Soviet SDI to be produced. 
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of two drawn swords facing one another, there should be two shields, so 
toughened as to allow the swords to be drastically reduced in size and re-
main sheathed. 
*  * 
Answers to questions by various Members 
It was impossible to distinguish between military and civilian objectives within 
the problems of SDI. Asked how the Europeans could play an active part, he be-
lieved that strong defences should be built up against Russian superiority in tanks 
and their submarines. He assumed that it would take between 10 and 20 years to 
change the strategy, and again stressed the need to retain the old strategy in the 
meantime. Otherwise, and not because of the SDI, destabilization would occur. 
SDI  and deterrence both continued inherent contradictions. To a question on 
President Reagan's U-turn on sharing research results (COCOM list), he pointed 
out that the Russians' pride would probably prevent them from accepting such an 
offer anyway. 
Turning to the offensive policy pursued by Admiral Gorschkow and the Russian 
navy, General Schmiickle believed he had detected more defensive tendencies in 
his successor Admiral Chernassin. 
The different tasks assigned under a Euro-American SDI would logically follow 
from the different sources of concern to Americans and Europeans (for the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany the main perceived threat would be from Russian tank 
superiority, while for Norway it would be Russian maritime superiority). Here-
peated that it would be easier for the Europeans to work on the SS 20s which in 
fact were threatening them. 
By contrast with the past, today a genuine policy of balance could be pursued. 
Disruption of what he regarded as the best system in international politics would 
trigger war which, in its present form, even if 'only' conventional weapons were 
used, would mean the end of everything. 
Initially the policy of deterrence would continue, and he too felt that a permanent 
dialogue was necessary to establish a balance between East and West, but failure 
of the policy also had to be considered. The necessary basis of security could 
never be abandoned. Defence as General Schmiickle envisaged it would be much 
cheaper. If the Russians did not accept the invitation 'to visit the laboratory' they 
could be expected to copy the West, which would amount to the same thing. 
36 Statement by Mr Frank Blackaby 
Director of SIPRI 
(International Peace Research Institute), Stockholm 
This is a short presentation on a very large subject. So I have tried to pick 
out one main point which is, in my view, the central point to make about 
European security. The main question I wish to ask, and try to answer, 
is this: what would a more secure Europe look like? That is, I assume, a 
common objective. Then, having tried to answer that question, I want to 
consider various ways in which we might move towards that desired 
goal. 
What would a more secure Europe look like?  The term 'security' is  a 
broad one- perhaps too broad for our purposes. I assume the concern 
is not with internal security issues, but simply with international security 
- that is  security from aggression by another nation. A more secure 
Europe, I suggest, can be defined fairly simply. It is one in which, in all 
countries in Europe, the use of armed force is no longer on the agenda of 
possible action for settling international disputes. It would be a Europe 
in which, when disputes occur (as of course they inevitably will) it never 
occurs to political leaders in any country to summon the chiefs of staff to 
Cabinet meetings. The use of armed force is off the agenda of political 
action. 
I don't think this is a particularly Utopian picture. It is, after all, already 
the case between many individual pairs of States in Europe or indeed be-
tween groups of States. There have been, and will undoubtedly continue 
to be, disputes between Sweden and Denmark, or Sweden and Norway. 
There have been, and no doubt will continue to be, disputes between 
France and West Germany. There is an obvious and continuous cause of 
dispute between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Yet in 
all these cases it is, I suggest, now unthinkable that any of these States 
would consider the use  of armed force as a way of  dealing with these dis-
putes. It is not on the agenda of political action. A more secure Europe, 
therefore, would be one in which practices already observed between a 
number of pairs of States, or individual groups of States, are generalized 
to Europe as a whole. 
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needed - for the development of  oases of security of  this kind. One thing 
that is  not needed is  a military balance.  There is  no military balance 
between Sweden and Norway~ There is certainly no military balance be-
tween the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Nor is there any 
need for some change in national character. What is needed is a pheno-
menon which I think is best described by the phrase 'the de-militarization 
of political relations'. 
What does that mean? It means that military considerations cease to play 
a role in the relations between those countries. Comparisons of forces 
are  just not relevant:  in  any  discussions  or negotiations between the 
countries, nobody refers to them. When Mrs Thatcher and Mr Fitzge-
rald were discussing what to do about Northern Ireland, Britain's total 
military superiority had nothing to do with the case. Nobody looked up 
details of military deployment in the Military Balance.  Between these 
two countries, that is, political relations have been demilitarized. The 
relative size of military forces ceases to be a factor of any importance. 
The problem of European security,  I  suggest,  can be  defined  as  the 
problem of generalizing the 'demilitarization of international political re-
lations'- and in particular, of course, extending it to the confrontation 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. 
Here, there is a long way to go. Europe is in a curious position, security-
wise.  There are  standing armies of unprecedented peace-time size  on 
either side of the dividing line in Europe. There is great military activity, 
new weapons, new deployments, new strategies. On both sides, in their 
manoeuvres the armies vigorously prepare for war. Any visitor from an-
other planet, viewing this scene, would conclude that there must be unre-
solved issues of immense importance between the parties on either side 
of that central division. 
Yet, of course, that is not the case. There is no major European political 
issue now between the two sides. For 20 years, there has been nothing 
which could have been a casus belli. There is no evidence that any nation 
has any intention of attempting to change the borders between the two 
sides by the use of armed force.  In this respect, there is  absolutely no 
comparison between Europe in 1985 and Europe in 1935. There is thus 
a major discrepancy between the military situation in Europe, and the 
political situation. The position is well encapsulated in the famous words 
of Professor Michael Howard, when he  was confronted with various 
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war supposed to be about?' 
This view, that neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO are likely to resort 
to the use of armed force, is widely held also by military experts. So the 
proponents of continued assiduous attention to military deployments fall 
back on a  second line of defence.  This is  that a  country gains great 
political advantages from some form of  military superiority, even if it has 
no intention of using it. We hear a great deal about the political uses of 
military power. 
This is,  I suggest,  one of the great unexamined cliches  of our time. 
Military force is a factor in political affairs if the country possessing it is 
prepared either to use it, or to threaten to use it in such a way that it is 
believed. Otherwise, it is not a factor at all. For it to be a factor, there 
has to be some explicit or implicit reference to the possibility of it being 
used. If  there is no such reference, then it does not matter. Britain and 
France are both nuclear-weapon powers. Has this in any way enabled 
them to do better than they otherwise would have done in the various ne-
gotiations with their partners in the European Economic Community? 
Not at all. 
This belief that military expenditure and military deployments can be 
used, in some vague and unspecified way, for political ends, has most 
unfortunate consequences. It leads to a development which is the exact 
opposite of the one required for a secure Europe-it leads to the milita-
rization of international political relations. It leads to military deploy-
ments which have no conceivable military purpose. It also leads to an ex-
cessive  concentration  on military  competition.  The long-term  conse-
quence of developments in that direction is that the use of military force 
gets put back on the agenda of possible action as a way of settling dis-
putes. If countries invest enormous sums in their military sector, and 
bring the military  into the central  process  of decision-making  about 
international relations, then sooner or later they will look for a return on 
their investment.  The militarization of international political relations 
leads in the long run to the suggestion of military solutions to interna-
tional political disputes. 
To sum up so far, we observed that in those groups of countries, or pairs 
of countries, where the possibility of the use of armed force is off the 
agenda  for  political  action  (a  good  definition  of security),  in  those 
countries political relations can be said to be 'demilitarized'. That is, the 
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relevant to any political matters under discussion between them. That is 
the state of affairs which we need to generalize in Europe. I have three 
comments about the way in which it might be done. 
First, there is need for a much broader and better understanding of the 
nature of international security. Many politicians, and many members of 
the public, still have a very primitive picture in their minds. That picture 
goes something like this. There are bad countries which possess military 
power. They will conquer the good countries (ourselves, of course) un-
less we stop them by spending as much on the military as they do. So 
long as  we do that, the bad countries will be stopped, and all will be 
well. We will be secure. I imagine I do not need on this occasion to stress 
the inadequacy of that primitive picture. Security is  not a function of 
military spending.  Indeed most decisions to change military structure, 
strategies, or weapons deployment - decisions which Ministries of De-
fence  and Chiefs-of-Staff are  making all  the time,  because they have 
nothing else to do - these decisions serve to increase security by their ac-
tion-reaction consequences.  Military expenditure and security are in-
versely correlated- as the first goes up, the second goes down. The idea 
that military expenditure buys security dies hard: but if we are to make 
any progress in Europe1 it is an idea which has to die. 
Secondly, there is a whole array of specific measures which can help in 
the direction of the demilitarization of international political relations in 
nations in Europe. Any measure which reduces vulnerability, or reduces 
the threat of surprise attack, or any measure which reduces the percep-
tion  of threat,  works in  the right  direction.  Any  and every  limit  or 
constraint on the military sector is an advantage. Further, any move in 
this direction, however small, may make further moves possible; it sets 
in motion a process leading towards the necessary down-grading of the 
importance of military deployments.  • 
At the Stockholm Conference, it is now reasonable to hope for an agree-
ment - but a very modest agreement. There will be some more notifica-
tion of manoeuvres and movements, and some more observation; and in 
exchange, as it were, there will be a declaration in some form on the non-
use of force. It is just possible there may be a constraint on the total size 
of manoeuvres, though that is uncertain. The problem now is to think 
what might be the next appropriate step in Europe. At least we have a 
large  inventory  of suggestions  - nuclear weapon-free  zones  or cor-
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military deployments that are more obviously defensiye, and so on. 
Perhaps one of  the main needs is to build up stronger interest groups who 
are concerned with arms control issues in Europe as a whole. Up to now 
the movements in Europe have been preoccupied with nuclear weapon 
issues;  it is  difficult to get broad general interest in questions such as 
measures to reduce the possibilities of surprise attack. There is  also a 
need to build up the interest groups concerned with arms control in the 
national bureaucracies themselves. In most countries in Europe there are 
enormous departments concerned with the process of adding to the stock 
of weapons, devising the new European fighter and so on. (The new Eu-
ropean fighter  is  a good example of the mindless preoccupation with 
military hardware - the automatic assumption that new models must go 
on replacing old for ever and always.) We find on the other side of the 
fence  just a small handful of functionaries in foreign offices faced with 
the problem of thinking about constraints.  The interest groups con-
cerned with new weapons developments are strong and powerful, and in 
order to make any progress in arms control in Europe some forms for 
countervailing power have to be found. 
The third comment I have is  this. If Europe - that is the area from 
the Adantic coast to the Polish border with the Soviet Union- were a 
self-contained  entity,  it  might not be  all  that difficult  to  establish  a 
secure Europe-defining security in the way this paper has done. There 
is  not much  bellicism  in Europe now,  to borrow Professor  Michael 
Howard's coinage: that is, those small groups which want to produce 
border changes in Europe have little support in the general population, 
whose main concern is to live a quiet life. However, Europe is not a self-
contained entity: there is substantial foreign military presence on both 
sides of the dividing line. So we are faced with the question - how far is 
it possible to make moves towards a more secure Europe if the Soviet 
Union and the United States are engaged in a global confrontation? 
On this most difficult issue, total European passivity is inappropriate. 
Obviously the global confrontation between the United States and the 
Soviet Union limits the freedom  of manoeuvre of European States -
much more so  for Warsaw Pact countries than for European NATO 
countries. However, some freedom of manoeuvre remains, and it should 
be  exploited and extended.  There can be  no security in Europe with 
these vast standing armies on either side of the dividing line. Security in 
Europe will come, if it ever comes, when military deployments play no 
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und Eastern  Europe.  That must  be  the  objective  for  those with the 
proper understanding of the nature of security. 
* 
*  * 
Questions were put by Mr Cicciomessere (Non-attached, Italy) Mr Boesmans 
(Soc., Belgium), Mr Pelikan (Soc., Italy), Mr Plaskovitis (Soc., Greece), Mr Segre 
(Com., Italy), Mr Blumenfeld (EPP, FRG), Mr Hutton (ED, UK), Mr Newens 
(Soc, UK), Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr Wedekind (EPP, FRG), Mr Romualdi 
(ER, Italy) and Mrs Piermont (Arc, FRG). 
Mr Blackaby replied on the general issue of security that ideologically homo-
geneous States were not necessarily essential for the demilitarization of interna-
tional relations, that in fact heterogeneity had to be accepted, and that it would 
be this acceptance that would lead to liberalization in Eastern Europe. Moreover 
the USSR was not an expansive but a status quo power in Europe. European 
security could be strengthened by more economic ties and improved bilateral ties 
such as those now being fostered between the two Germanies. It would not be 
strengthened if Europe was dragged into 'out-of-area' disputes between the super-
powers. 
On the Stockhom Conference, Mr Blackaby noted that the relationship between 
confidence-building and demilitarization was a two-way one. He argued that 
agreements tended to follow other agreements as they had done in the 1970s, but 
conceded that nothing had come from the unilateral Western chemical weapon 
disarmament. He confirmed that any declaration on no use of force would apply 
within the military pacts as well  as  between them.  However, the question of 
nuclear-free zones was not on the Stockholm agenda because a consensus for it 
was lacking. The Ten had tended not to take collective action. 
42 Statement by Colonel Jonathan Alford 
Deputy Director, IISS 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies), London 
I have been asked to direct my remarks to 'the general situation in Europe 
with regard to deployment and balance of military forces'. Deployment 
is not difficult, if by that we mean who has got what and where. I trust 
we  do have  a fairly  clear idea about the numbers in Europe of men, 
weapons, formations, ships and aircraft. It  is not easy now to keep these 
things hidden. In the Military Balance each year my institute provides, as 
accurately as we know how, a version of the military catalogue. Others 
do the same and none of us are offering widely different accounts of the 
numbers. 
On the other hand 'the general situation - with regard to - balance', 
sets a task which I regard as impossible. We can- and do- compare 
total numbers of things on the NATO side with the total of like things in 
the Warsaw Pact. If  that were the 'balance', well and good. In a purely 
mechanistic sense,  I can tell  you that, if you care to add together all 
NATO's tanks and measure them against all the Warsaw Pact's tanks, 
you  will  find  an  adverse  ratio  of 1:2.59.  That  statement  certainly 
conceals much more than it reveals - and the things that it conceals 
could, if they could be evaluated, tell you at least as much (and probably 
more) about capability as raw numbers. Even a preliminary list of things 
contributing to the total capability of any tank force would have to in-
clude training, ammunition stock levels, age, performance, maintenance 
condition and repair facilities, morale and motivation. Moreover, even if 
you could find a way - which you cannot - of qualifying tank numbers 
by taking each of these factors into account, it would still not tell you 
much of what you want to know because war is most unlikely to consist 
of a duel between tanks. So I am going to tell you that I do not know 
what the military balance is. It is best that you should realize that there is 
no way known to man of scoring total military capabilities in such a way 
as to provide a convincing account of the state of the military balance 
between East and West. There are some ways of achieving a closer ap-
proximation than raw numbers but none are sufficiently refined to be at 
all useful in a predictive sense. 
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stability.  I simply do not know what figures  calculated in what way 
would be  reassuring or encouraging and what would be alarming to 
either side. What I am quite certain of is that what may well serve to de-
ter may not be enough to win if deterrence fails. What deters is a particu-
lar view of the state of the military equation heavily qualified by politics 
and a sense of larger risks and opportunities. Thus I would certainly as-
sume  that perceptions of the state of the military balance is  but one 
factor among many in contributing to stability in Europe.  But if that 
stability (for whatever reason) breaks down, NATO might have to be a 
lot stronger than is needed to deter if it is to deny the Warsaw Pact any 
significant military gains. 
I will assume that NATO does now possess adequate military capability 
for the less demanding purposes of deterrence. But deterrence may (for 
whatever reason and in whatever manner) fail and NATO has to address 
itself to the more demanding requirements of defence. This permits me 
to move forward onto the rather more solid ground of options and vul-
nerabilities and to worry less about national balances. We can say with a 
degree of confidence what could cause one side in war to lose. It will lose 
if it runs out of ammunition before the other side. It will lose if it cannot 
keep its air force in the air and operating through the closure or degrada-
tion of its bases. It will lose if the number and quality of  its reserve forces 
and the rate of incorporation of these reserves into its forces are signifi-
cantly  less  than  on  the  other  side.  It  will  lose  if it  cannot  main-
tain the integrity of its command structure and essential communica-
tions.  Any  alliance  may well  lose  if its  political  cohesion evaporates 
under the stress of crisis. This alliance is likely to lose if it cannot defend 
certain key  strategic areas:  northern Norway, the Greenland-Iceland-
UK  Gap, the Dardanelles, the disembarkation ports.  This  alliance is 
likely to lose if its loses it eyes and ears. This alliance is likely to lose if it 
cannot generally shield its mobilization and reinforcement with standing 
forces, naval forces and airpower. 
Are there significant asymmetries that we ought to worry about? If  there 
are, this should suggest some priorities for the allocation of scarce re-
sources. 
NATO is now paying much more attention to stocks of all kinds and it 
must continue to do so  if it wishes to retain the option of fighting  a 
longer war. There is not much that one can say with certainty about war 
which is, as Voltaire noted 'like medicine; murderous and conjectural', 
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of ammunition. Calculations about the rate at which ammunition would 
be expended in war are hard to make but we have at least a series of 
historical judgments to call upon which indicate that things always get 
used up faster than people anticipate. It is best to err on the conservative 
side  in  deciding  how much  ammunition  and  how  many  spares  are 
'enough'.  These  things  are  costly  and  it  is  tempting  to  skimp. 
Please don't. 
NATO is sensibly anxious about the protection of its (too few) main air-
force operating bases. I would certainly put more money into airfield de-
fence and I am prepared to listen very carefully to those  who argue that 
part of  this protection comes from an ability to put enemy air  bases out of 
action and to keep them out in order to reduce the number of sorties that 
an enemy can mount to manageable proportions- manageable, that is, 
by air defences. But I suggested that we ought now also to be thinking 
about the non-nuclear missile threat to air  bases (which pushes one in the 
direction of ATBM defences) and the chemical threat which, in my ex-
perience, politicians prefer to ignore. Again I shall do no more than state 
that he who loses his airpower will probably lose the war. 
I do not think  tha~ NATO is taking its reserve structures seriously enough 
nor is it prepared to take steps to utilize effectively the very large reserve 
potential that exists. Reserves are a relatively inexpensive form of com-
bat power and they are likely to be relatively more effective in defence 
than in attack. And they are an important component in the balance, 
whatever the balance is. There will be casualties in the standing forces 
and casualties must be replaced. Most countries rely to a critical degree 
on reservists for many vital logistic functions. And reservists can quite 
simply provide a framework of territorial defence.  Yet I am often dis-
tressed to find that many countries underfund their reserve structures, do 
not allocate enough money for their training and simple equipment, do 
not meet their own stated obligations. Mobilization exercises in NATO 
countries are rare indeed.  Reserves may not do all  that much for de-
terrence; I suggest that they can do a great deal for defence. While stocks 
of munitions and air defences do now seem to be getting a reasonable 
priority in NATO, I sense that reserves still are not. 
This leads to the North Atlantic. Given that NATO could win a short 
war but lose a longer one, reinforcements from the Continental United 
States become important for it is in that time frame that they begin to be 
significant. Clearly the ability to fly in the men of divisions based in the 
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reinforcing option but after that the Atlantic bridge takes over for the 
bulk of the transfer and it seems to me essential that NATO can beat 
back or contain the Soviet submarine threat. It is here that the defence of 
northern Norway assumes what I regard as a critical importance. If  the 
airfields of northern Norway were to fall  into Soviet hands, not only 
would defence of Soviet interests in the far North be greatly simplified 
but the offensive threat to NATO's maritime interests and to the United 
Kingdom - as a vital link in the reinforcing chain - would greatly in-
crease. The struggle to control the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap would, 
under such circumstances, be very much more difficult for NATO. This 
is not to deny that the Central Front is the most important region for the 
West. Lose there and not much else matters. But hold there initially and 
losses elsewhere would begin to bear very heavily in NATO's ability to 
hold the centre in the longer run. That is why the flanks matter strategic-
ally and militarily if they did not also matter politically. NATO cannot 
as an alliance be selective about what countries matter. 
In a short introductory statement there is much that I have not said. Un-
expectedly,  perhaps, I  have  not spoken about technology  nor about 
money. That is because I assume that new technology will be abundant 
and money short. It is  not to suggest that NATO can afford to ignore 
technological developments. It never has; it will not now. But put the 
two together and NATO, it seems to me, will not be able to afford an 
accelerated replacement programme which incorporates anything like all 
the technology that can be made available. Nor should we believe that 
technology can solve security dilemmas. It can only help to solve some of 
them. I must say also that I remain very sceptical about some of the new 
technological ideas in vogue at the moment. What the public (and, it 
must be  said, many politicians) tend all  too often to forget is  that we 
have a stock of equipment which we cannot afford to change anything 
like as rapidly as technology is changing. 
We can only afford to change about 5°/o of it each year, assuming at least 
a 20-year operational life for the equipment that we buy. Thus we are 
condemned to permanent obsolescence. I think that what this means is 
that we  are bound from  now on to see  evolutionary and not revolu-
tionary changes in weapon systems. 
To be frank, I cannot give the answer that most are seeking. I cannot tell 
you with any precision where we are today; nor can I tell you where we 
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Warsaw Pact for a time if everything went right for NATO and some of 
the things which could so easily go wrong for the Warsaw Pact were to 
go  wrong for  them.  Evidently NATO could lose  rather quickly  if a 
number of things went wrong for them and most things went right for 
the Warsaw Pact. It is in that zone of uncertainty in which we seem to 
reside and I doubt if we shall ever be able to move through this zone to 
the sunlit uplands of unqualified security and complete confidence in 
NATO's defensive capability. But equally I do not see why NATO need 
slip into a slough of despond, for the conquest of Europe is unlikely to 
seem easy to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact. Nor can they ever afford to 
discount the real risks of any major war escaping control. What I have 
suggested here is that the Alliance ought not to find it difficult to do what 
it  is  necessary to do to close  off most of the most dangerous Soviet 
options in war and to reduce its obvious vulnerabilities by prudent atten-
tion and investment in sensible things. 
* 
*  * 
Responding to questions by Mr Hutton (ED, UK), Mr Mallet (EPP, France) and 
Mr Normanton (ED, UK),  Colonel Alford stated, in regard to reserve forces, 
that they offered a nation the means of  rapidly increasing its military power with-
out maintaining large armed forces in time of peace. Whereas UK reserve forces 
could quickly reinforce the British Rhine Army, NATO's continental States could 
incorporate their reserves, based on conscription, into their territorial structure. 
On the other hand, reserve manpower could only be used effectively within three 
years of full-time service. 
On chemical warfare, Colonel Alford believed that it was necessary to try effec-
tively to ban chemical weapons, to secure which both verification and on-site in-
spection were essential.  The existence of stocks of chemical weapons on both 
sides in Europe in World War II  had acted as an effective deterrent. The per-
formance  of an  airbase  could  be  degraded  up  to  85%  by  use  of chemical 
weapons, which thus rendered adequate deterrence essential in his view. Binary 
chemical weapons were preferable as a deterrent. 
Replying on NATO finances,  Colonel Alford explained that the 1978 NATO 
target of 3% of  the GNP of  each State had set a standard to which to aspire. Since 
1979 the average had been 2.4% in all NATO countries, but it would be less in 
the next seven years, especially in the UK.  Also the US  Congress would only 
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although there would thus be less real money available for NATO funding, the 
existing funds were being used more efficiently. 
Answering a question on NATO's southern flank Colonel Alford said that be-
cause it was very·much separated from the central sector and northern flank, co-
herent defence of the southern flank was difficult. The key to command of the 
Mediterranean area was land-based air power; Greece and Turkey required as-
sistance from the Twelve for the modernization of their forces. 
Turning to NATO preparedness,  it was Colonel Alford's view that, although 
some countries were not even making a minimal contribution, the military side 
were more serious about working together, and in the coming seven years of re-
stricted funds for NATO, would move towards joint procurement in order to 
maintain adequate forces.  . 
Colonel Alford then replied to questions posed by Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr 
Newens (Soc., UK), Mr Bernard-Reymond (EPP, France), Mrs Piermont (ARC, 
FRG)  and  Mrs  Charzat  (Soc.,  France).  As  regards  verification  of chemical 
weapons,  he  was 'moderately optimistic' that this  could  be  achieved  with a 
reasonable chance of being observed. 
Turning to defence and deterrence, Colonel Alford expressed the view that, be-
cause a nuclear war was impossible to fight, it was important to deter an enemy 
who might decide to attack with conventional weapons. 
The effectiveness of  deterrence might be broken down in a crisis or by accident. It 
was essential to be able to defend the West without resort to nuclear weapons 
and unthinkable that the West would use the latter if defeated in a conventional 
war. 
As regards chemical weapons, Colonel Alford held the view that their use should 
be deterred by stocking chemical weapons. The European allies of the USA must 
be consulted and must agree before binary chemical weapons could be used. 
Some consultation had taken place at official level before authorization had been 
given  for the production of binary weapons in the USA.  Production of these 
would take 3-4 years and they would be stored in the USA. 
In reply to questions about the application to deterrence of high technology, Co-
lonel Alford said that he was very sceptical about Star Wars I and fairly sceptical 
about Star Wars II, as the technology would not be available at affordable cost 
and as it could be countered. For example, sensor technology could be relatively 
easily overcome as, if one small link was broken, its efficacy would be removed. 
In general, every NATO State must do enough to retain the goodwill of others, 
e.g. Denmark must provide air defence of its airfields. The more Western Eu-
ropean  countries  joined  NATO,  the  easier  it  would  be  to  solve  political 
problems. 
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Thank you, Mr Chairman. It is a pleasure and an honour to have this 
opportunity of addressing you, ladies and gentlemen, but before I start, 
may I by way of introduction draw your attention to the fact that I do 
not represent official circles in France, that I am deputy director of a 
private research  institute, which  obviously has close links with those 
who are responsible for French policy, both in the majority and the op-
position, but that our studies are independent ones. You must not be 
surprised therefore, if the reflections which you will hear do not follow 
the line normally taken by French official circles. This will also explain 
why I am more free in my criticism of certain people who are not French, 
but who are our European partners, as well as certain lines of thought on 
questions of European defence. 
I should like to go on to deal with three points: firstly to set out France's 
role and strategy in European security; then to show how, in my view, 
that strategy and that doctrine are increasingly out of line with the geo-
strategic situation in which we live - I think that we must move towards 
increased rapprochement between France and her European allies, and 
also between the European allies and France, as I shall explain later; and 
finally,  I  shall  deal  with possible  ways  of trying  to resolve  the new 
political, technological and strategic problems which have arisen in con-
nection with European security. 
First a review of French policy and thinking. 
Quite  simply,  France's  defence  policy  is  based  on two  ideas,  inde-
pendence and solidarity. Independence, in that France's defence doctrine 
is  based on nuclear weapons and early deterrence on a massive scale. 
One could say that it is the purest form of deterrence, because France 
says, 'We are not going to fight, we are not going into battle, we are 
going to escalate the situation immediately by a passive strike against the 
population'. A defence policy like this obviously implies that the decision 
to fire  nuclear weapons is  a  purely national one.  Hence the idea  of 
France's independence in taking decisions which have to do with matters 
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with the logical decision to acquire a nuclear force in 1960, led General 
de Gaulle, six years later, to withdraw French forces from the Alliance, 
and  therefore  from  Saceur's  command,  and  to  place  them  under 
genuinely French control, but subject to the second idea, that of solidar-
ity. Certainly France recognizes that she is part of the Alliance: she did 
not leave the Alliance in 1966, she continued to be a member of the 
political organizations, she says that France's security is  still bound to 
that of her allies, and particularly that of Germany. For that purpose a 
number of cooperation  agreements were  signed  at military level,  the 
agreements in 1967. The French forces in Germany remain in Germany 
- you know that we have 50 000 men stationed in Federal Germany -
but within the framework of a Franco-German agreement. And finally, 
in the event of a crisis the French Government may or may not decide to 
place French forces under the command of the allied commander, i. e. 
Saceur, in which case the French forces would act as the Alliance's re-
serve in times of crisis. 
Those are the dispositions, if you like, as they were made in the 1960s 
and as they are today, 20 years later. There are obvious advantages from 
the French point of view. Firstly it provides political independence vis-a-
vis the United States, as well as offering the possibility of independent 
policies at East-West level vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Then, at military 
level,  it  provides  a  basic  insurance  should  the  United  States  decide 
against nuclear escalation, which, as  we shall see  shortly, has in fact 
happened with the passage of time. And finally, there is also a domestic 
advantage, in that the creation of a purely national defence policy with 
its appeal to public opinion has, after 20 years, resulted in a very strong 
consensus on defence policy in France, and a kind of resistance, what 
one might call  immunity, to the pacifist phenomenon which  has ap-
peared in some of our neighbours, including those on the other side of 
the Atlantic in the United States. 
It also has obvious disadvantages. First of all within the Alliance, since, 
clearly, it does pose a continuing problem with our neighbours, espe-
cially with Federal Germany, which in tum helps those people, particu-
larly in Germany, who do not believe in French support, and say so 
openly. 
The  problem  is  further  complicated  by  the  role  of tactical  nuclear 
weapons, especially plutonium ones, which have the rather embarrassing 
characteristic of landing on the soil of the German Federal Republic, our 
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therefore difficult to assert that we are making a contribution to Germa-
ny's security, when we have arms which are capable of destroying the 
Germans. Which people like Egon Bahr use as an argument for saying 
that in  a crisis Germany would be destroyed twice over, first  by the 
Russians, and then by the French. Which is  obviously - I shall come 
back to the Americans in one moment, Madam - problematical. 
On the military side, I believe that this situation, this doctrine, also poses 
a  problem  in  that we  do  in  fact  have  in  Europe two very  different 
doctrines existing side by side. 
The doctrine of the Alliance is one of combat; the entire doctrine of the 
flexible response, which was adopted by the Atlantic Alliance in 1967, is 
a doctrine which accepts the idea of a relatively prolonged conventional 
conflict, with the possibility of  nuclear escalation, which Colonel Alford, 
Mr Abshire and probably all NATO circles, agree should be deferred for 
as long as possible. 
Whereas the French doctrine is the opposite. The French doctrine, Ire-
peat, rejects combat. Mr Hemu has said so very clearly, and his prede-
cessors as well.  There is  no question of France's fighting at the tradi-
tional level, and therefore if there were a battle in Europe the role of the 
French forces  would merely be to act as  a signal, if you like,  a final 
warning signal to the Soviets before the nuclear strike. 
Which  produces  another  military  problem.  We  are  asking  the  first 
French army, which is  deployed on both sides of the Rhine, to play a 
dual role with a double function,  i.  e.  to act as  a reserve  within the 
Alliance, which is what we say as well, but also to act as  a test force 
ahead of the nuclear strike. It is very difficult to do the two things simul-
taneously,  because if the French forces  are in  fact to act as  a reserve 
within the Alliance, they must have advanced conventional equipment at 
least equivalent to that of the Bundeswehr and a modus operandi similar 
to that of the Bundeswehr, and there must be very close cooperation with 
the forces of the Alliance from the start if this combat reserve is to be 
possible. But that does not apply to the French forces, whose role, Ire-
peat, is  essentially to act  as  a  signal  before the nuclear escalation is 
launched. The trouble with this policy, in addition to the difficulties I 
have just mentioned, and this is the point about this doctrine which I cri-
ticized at length in a recent work is the fact that this doctrine, this de-
fence policy, goes back some 25 years. It is a political doctrine which was 
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and te.chnological environment radically different from that in which we 
are living today. 
In  fact,  the idea of the national sanctuary, of nuclear protection for 
France with the weak deterring the strong from making a massive re-
sponse, is thinkable only in a world in which nuclear arms on both sides 
are  very  inaccurate,  rudimentary  even,  and where  the only possible 
targets are cities. When the Soviets' only possible targets in France were 
the large conurbations, France's threat to erase Moscow or Leningrad 
from the map was, to my mind, credible. 
But as soon as the Soviets were equipped with more options for selective 
nuclear strikes, and tomorrow's non-nuclear chemical and conventional 
weapons, with extremely accurate, fast ballistic missiles, then one has to 
ask how far in times of crisis the President of the French Republic would 
be pushed into a situation of doubt which would ruin the efficiency of 
the system. 
The system is also based on the axiom that our relations with Germany, 
France's principal economic partner, would remain stable and secure in 
the context of an American anti-nuclear war within the framework of 
NATO, because,  despite what Colonel Alford said just now, NATO 
seeks to shelter under the nuclear umbrella, i.  e.  the American nuclear 
umbrella. 
Unfortunately, however, the trend in the balance of power and the trend 
of the technological situation in Europe have tended to be, and this is 
something which I must emphasize, to weaken the American nuclear, 
American  anti-nuclear,  umbrella  for  Germany  and  Europe,  thereby 
creating a strategic situation which, to my mind, reverses the status quo 
in Europe and the facts of French defence policy. 
Very quickly, this is my second point, what are the new factors in the 
strategic situation in  Europe?  At the moment there are three trends: 
firstly,  a trend towards a balance of forces;  then the trend of public 
opinion in the West, faced with the nuclear deterrent; lastly, the trend of 
nuclear technology towards a diminution of the role of  nuclear weapons. 
These three currents are combining to call in question the strategy of 
nuclear  weapons  as  the fundamental  pivot of the  security  system  in 
Europe. 
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simply that the problem of the credibility of nuclear weapons for the de-
fence of Europe has been around since the 1950s, or since the point at 
which the United States  became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike 
against its own territory. It is therefore an old problem. In the 30 years 
since then the problem has only worsened in fact, in so far as we have 
tried, within the context of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, to offset 
the Soviet Union's local superiority in conventional arms by means of 
local, regional, nuclear arms in Europe and the American strategic nuc-
lear weapons. 
Over the years this doctrine of the flexible response, which was based on 
the United States' control of  escalation, has gradually been vitiated as the 
Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity with the United States, meaning 
de facto neutralization of the American strategic nuclear capability to de-
fend anything but the United States itself, and as the Soviet Union has 
added to its conventional superiority in Europe a nuclear superiority 
which increasingly threatens to provide a counter-offensive capability, 
with the result that the control of escalation has switched camps. 
It is  no longer the Americans who have  control over the first  use  of 
atomic weapons, the control has gone over to the Soviet side, and we are 
now, today, living in the situation where NATO has never been so de-
pendent  on  American  nuclear  weapons,  and  where  the  first  use  of 
American atomic weapons in Europe's defence has never been so lacking 
in credibility, and so complex. May I cite as e_vidence the discovery by all 
the strategic and political circles in America that it has become far too 
dangerous for the United States to use nuclear weapons for the defence 
of Europe at an early stage of  the conflict. Henry Kissinger, in 1979, fol-
lowed by Liberals like McNamara, and members of the Reagan admi-
nistration like Freddy Clay, Mr Weinberger's deputy, all say the same 
thing, in association with the American bishops, the American pacifists 
and the European pacifists.  What do  they say?  That NATO can no 
longer rely on the first use of American nuclear weapons in the event of a 
crisis, and that in any case there should be a movement at least towards 
'no early use', towards the latest possible use of nuclear weapons, and 
better still, towards 'no use at all'. The best thing would be to use conven-
tional American weapons as a deterrent to Soviet conventional weapons, 
and  when  I  listened  to my  colleague,  Colonel  Alford,  say  here  this 
morning that nuclear arms are a deterrent only to nuclear arms, and that 
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only  voicing  what  has  become  the  new  philosophy  of the  Atlantic 
Alliance, and what is for me a major revolution, because it means that 
the nuclear cornerstone of the Alliance is gradually being removed. 
The second trend which is being added to this is the attitude of the Eu-
ropean and the American public to the nuclear problem. There is not 
time to go into this here, but we can return to it during question time-
,  it is a phenomenon which my institute has studied at length, and it is very 
interesting that Western opinion, particularly in Europe, is  now anti-
nuclear. There are many reasons for it, some are the result of national 
characteristics, but there are certain basic elements which are common 
throughout.  I would say that there is  increasing public awareness -
basically people feel less and less that the United States provides absolute 
security, and that the price of  that security has become too high, whether 
in terms of relations with the Soviet Union, or in terms of risk. 
There is  increasing awareness in Europe that the risks which nuclear 
weapons, especially the new generation of nuclear weapons such as the 
Pershing and Cruise missiles, pose for Europe have become intolerable 
and that it would be better not to have to depend on these weapons. The 
same phenomenon of the nuclear risk is occurring in the United States, 
and it is that risk which lies behind President Reagan's SDI policy. When 
President Reagan proposed to the American people on 23 March 1983 
that they close the nuclear age and go on to a new post-nuclear era, he 
was exploiting the pacifist ideal, and indeed making it legitimate, by 
saying that nuclear weapons were dangerous and that a non-nuclear de-
fence system was needed. 
And finally, the third factor which has to be added to this questioning at-
titude- I am sorry to gloss so quickly over these social phenomena, 
which are important, and I shall be happy to return to them- is the 
technological aspect.  It seems to me that we are going through a very 
fundamental technological change in the game, and that the 1980s are 
likely to be just as revolutionary as the 1950s were, with the major re-
volutions  brought  about  by  thermo-nuclear  weapons,  nuclear  sub-
marines and ballistic missiles. 
The 1980s are likely to bring a technological revolution which is just as 
great. This time, though, it will be in the sphere of non-nuclear, rather 
than nuclear, weapons. It is the field of conventional, or space weapons. 
And what we are witnessing in fact is, if you like, a pincer movement, 
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top, tendering the use of nuclear arms less and less necessary. 
The dream of a traditional form of defence, using weapons which do the 
same job as nuclear arms, but without the same risks, is again becoming 
thinkable, if not possible, and this is what is behind the debate which Jo-
nathan  Alford  mentioned  just  now,  on  'smart'  weapons  and  space 
weapons. These three currents, then - public opinion, technology and 
the balance of forces  - seem  to me  to pose a fundamental  question 
about the nuclear phenomenon in the Atlantic Alliance. What then are 
the implications for us Europeans, and for us French? 
Let me say for myself, that as a European I find this trend disquieting, 
and I know that some people here will disagree with me, but I, for my 
part, am convinced that it is  the only thing which restrains the Soviet 
Union from the direct use of force in Europe - let me say I think the So-
viet Union's strategy in Europe is a strategy of intimidation and political 
exploitation of the balance of military forces, and that the Soviet Union 
has no military ambitions in Europe which cannot be achieved at the 
political level, hut that in the event of crisis and internal problems in the 
Soviet Union I think the Soviet Union could be seduced by more or less 
limited military action and that the only thing which has dissuaded the 
Soviet Union from taking the short-cut to history hitherto is precisely the 
nuclear deterrent and all that it implies, in terms of the uncontrollability 
of nuclear warfare. 
A point which has just been discussed and which the Soviets recognize. 
At this level  therefore, anything which might affect that fundamental 
doubt, that fundamental uncertainty, would seem to me to be extraordi-
narily dangerous for Europe. As a European, the trend which we can see 
on both the American and the Soviet side towards conventionalization of 
warfare, towards regional limitation of conventional and nuclear risks, 
seems to me to be a very dangerous thing. Whether it be the debate over 
'smart' weapons, the SDI debate, or the debate over short- und medium-
range nuclear weapons, these are apparently dangerous trends, and for 
me, as a European, the real challenge is certainly to equip with conven-
tional resources capable of convincing the Soviets that they would not 
win easily, hut above all to maintain at the top of the Soviet political and 
military hierarchies awareness of the risk of uncontrollable escalation. 
I consider this to be a fundamental point. It  is at precisely this level that I 
think the role of American nuclear weapons will diminish in future as 
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add another point: I would say that for Europe the danger of this new 
technological phase is that we may be led increasingly towards Balkan-
ization and marginalization in relation to major technological develop-
ments - not because our engineers are any worse than any others, but 
because there is an enormous financial gap between us, the United States 
and Japan, which can also be explained by the Balkanization of our mar-
kets - and that we therefore run the risk of falling behind very rapidly, 
unless we join the technological race, whether it be in space weapons, or 
conventional weapons. 
In any case, where France is concerned I think it is now clear to everyone 
in France and elsewhere, and the opinion polls and statements by the 
political parties show it as well, that there is  a very marked tendency 
here: it is clear that in France France's security is closely associated with 
that of its European partners. In France non-aggression and armed neu-
trality are not a viable option and France's defence policy is increasingly 
dictated by what is  happening elsewhere, particularly in Federal Ger-
many. I should just like to say - this is my final point and I shall try to 
hurry, I have been asked to speak quickly-in recent years, let's say over 
the last 10 years, there has been a great deal of discussion in France over 
how to modify France's military doctrine, so as to make a positive con-
tribution to the overall security of the Continent, and of Federal Ger-
many in particular. The debate started with Mr Giscard d'Estaing and 
gathered speed with Mr Mitterrand, and I think over the last few years 
there have been a number of initiatives which are worth mentioning, al-
beit briefly. Of these the position which France took alongside the FRG 
in the matter of Euro-missiles was very important politically. Secondly, 
the reactivation of the 1963 Elysee agreement and the resumption of mi-
litary cooperation between France and Germany. Thirdly, the creation 
of the rapid strike force, which may not have had a revolutionary effect 
on the course of France's strategic policy, but which has certainly altered 
it. For me these are all leading in the same direction, even if, as I have 
pointed out, they do have their inadequacies. This applies particularly to 
the rapid strike force, which does indeed provide France with the means 
to react quickly in the frontline, as our German partners wish, but in my 
opinion does not resolve the basic contradiction which I mentioned at 
the beginning of this speech, between the role of  the first army, a nuclear 
role, and the contribution of these forces to the Atlantic Alliance espe-
cially in Federal Germany. 
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tives are concerned, notably Eureka, which to my mind is a truncated re-
sponse to the strategic and technological problems posed by SDI, and 
something which I would have preferred to have seen described as a mi-
litary matter. 
There are also inadequacies, but this is more the fault of our partners 
than of us, in the way in which France's very precise overtures in space 
matters have repeatedly been rejected by our German partners. 
Where is this speech leading, what conclusions are to be drawn? 
It seems to me as a European that there are several things which must be 
understood:  first,  it is  now clear,  and the Americans,  be  they of the 
Right, or the Left, or liberal conservatives, have made it quite clear to us, 
that we can no longer rely blindly on the American nuclear umbrella, ex-
cept as a kind of last resort, but an extremely theoretical one, particu-
larly as we are moving towards deployment of a defensive rocket system, 
the SDI. I believe that in this case we shall be heading towards regiona-
lization of the conventional and nuclear threat in Europe, and that in 
that context only short-range Soviet  and American  nuclear weapons 
would be used, with extremely grave consequences for Europe. 
First conclusion, therefore, as Europeans, we must rescue what remains 
of the nuclear deterrent in Europe, we must have in this continent the 
means to strike at the Soviet Union itself if we want to continue to deter 
it. Second point, as regards traditional weapons, we obviously have to 
equip with conventional resources, because in the absence of that we 
shall probably come up against a wave of opinion in the United States, 
which will be increasingly hostile to the continued presence of American 
forces in Europe. Helmut Schmidt made proposals on this point. I see 
that unfortunately they were not taken up by either French or German 
political circles. But there is no one reason, no ineluctable demographic 
or historical circumstance, why France, Germany and the other Euro-
peans should be incapable of putting up  a number of divisions large 
enough to pose a problem for the Soviet military authorities. 
Third conclusion, in the debate over European defence and what should 
be done to improve European cooperation, I believe that we must not 
create artificial problems, which is what I think institutional problems 
are. I do not think it matters whether it is the WEU, or the EP, or the At-
lantic Assembly, it is positive things which matter. They can be achieved. 
This is what I said in my book, and it generated a certain amount of 
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seems to me that France has to choose between two possible defence 
policies. The first is the one which we have now and which consists of 
waiting for the Russians at the Rhine. To wait for the Russians at the 
Rhine would, I believe, be a guarantee of serious political Balkanization 
in Europe. We have a choice between waiting for the Russians at the 
Rhine or going to join the collective defence in the front line. And that is 
why I have proposed that our defence, notably the second army, be de-
ployed at the front on terms to be negotiated between France and Ger-
many, but along the lines of  what the Germans want. On the other hand, 
and this is less popular in Germany, I believe that this redeployment of 
the French forces in Germany would also lead to the redeployment of 
French nuclear forces in Germany with the ability to strike deep into the 
Warsaw Pact forces, which means that Federal Germany and the Ger-
mans must consider very carefully the idea of nuclear weapons and how 
much of  the nuclear deterrent they wish to retain in their system. It is my 
impression, and I say this without malice or arrogance, that the Ger-
mans, the silent majority in Germany, are tending increasingly towards 
the non-nuclear opinion. 
If  that is the concept of German defence in the future, I think that there 
are going to be problems for France and for European security in gen-
eral. What I fear in fact is that if this trend continues to gain support in 
Germany,  if Germany is  interested  only in traditional  weapons  and 
leaves nuclear and space weapons for the superpowers on the assump-
tion that they are nothing to do with Germany, then, I think, it will be in-
creasing the risk to itself and France will in any case choose a different 
terrain and a different road. And I should simply like to tell our German 
friends here that whether Germany elects to produce a joint observation 
satellite with France or not, whether or not it elects to go  along with 
France's space policy, France will go ahead. France will quite simply use 
the limited funds which are at its disposal, which will lead to further cuts 
in its conventional forces, and a German decision not to join a joint Eu-
ropean space project would inevitably result in a weakening of the con-
ventional resources which France could make available to Federal Ger-
many. 
I shall end there, and say that for me the danger in Europe at the moment 
lies  in  the removal  of the nuclear deterrent,  the regionalization  and 
conventionalization  of warfare  in  Europe  and the technological  and 
political Balkanization of our respective defence policies. 
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to take note of these challenges and for us  to stop deluding ourselves 
with escapist policies which either believe that technology is the supreme 
resoutce, which  is  the American approach (SDI,  Rogers Plan, 'smart' 
weapons), or, what one hears in Europe, that negotiation with the So-
viets is the answer to everything. 
I hope that I shall be given the opportunity during question time to say 
what I think about arms control negotiations and the wholly illusory na-
ture of them as far as any concrete relationship between them and our 
security is concerned. I shall finish there. 
* 
*  * 
Questions were put by Mr Bernard-Raymond (EPP, France), Lady Elles (ED, 
UK),  Mrs  Charzat  (Soc.,  France),  Mr Plaskovitis  (Soc.,  Greece),  Mr Segre 
(Com., Italy), Mr Penders (EPP, Netherlands), Mr Mallet (EPP, France), Mrs 
Piermont (ARC, FRG) and Mr Vgenopoulos (Soc., Greece). 
Mr Lellouche replied that new funds and a better industrial policy were needed in 
order to rehabilitate the run-down of French conventional forces. (Only 3 i% of 
GDP was spent per year on defence as opposed to 6% in the early 1960s.) West 
European governments had to find money to intensify the European new techno-
logy research, just as the Pentagon had in the USA. He argued that the UK and 
French nuclear deterrents would have to be gradually Europeanized. He thought 
that the SDI would have no effect at all on concepts of deterrence. He was also 
dismissive of the concept of nuclear-free zones. 
Mr Lellouche agreed that there was a certain illusionary quality about the French 
public consensus on defence policy and that this tended to be focused only on the 
more symbolic elements of deterrence. 
Finally he expressed scepticism on arms control, believing that it would bear very 
little fruit and would lead to arms races in weapons not covered by agreements. 
He predicted that the process started at Geneva would lead to an accord on INF 
weapons which might be contrary to European interests. 
59 Statement by Professor Stefano Silvestri 
Vice-Chairman of the IAI 
(Institute for International Affairs), Rome 
I shall endeavour to be brief, in the hope that I shall be able to make 
good  any omissions  at a  later stage  in response  to any questions or 
doubts expressed regarding this concise statement of my views.  As  re-
gards European security in the Mediterranean, I think it should be made 
clear in the first place that the Mediterranean is an area with special fea-
tures which certainly exert a powerful influence on Europe but in which 
the balance of  power and security problems do not take the same form as 
in  Central Europe. To start with, in Europe there are various simul-
taneous and overlapping conflicts - regional, sub-regional, national, 
international, East-West and North-South- and any other kinds one 
may care to think of. The security relationships in the Mediterranean area 
are not so much relationships between Mediterranean countries them-
selves  as  alliances  between  individual  Mediterranean  States  and 
countries  outside  the  region:  for  instance,  between  Greece  and  the 
United States, Yugoslavia and the United States,Yugoslavia and the So-
viet Union, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, but not between Yugoslavia 
and Greece or Yugoslavia and Italy. There are no unifying factors at that 
level; it is an area in which countries share common borders rather than 
a unified area, one in which countries are opposed to, rather than united 
with, one another - in short there is  no unifying factor,  and that is 
either because there is  no capacity for  cohesion amongst the various 
States or else because there is no external hegemonic power capable of 
unifying the whole area.  This is  true from the political and strategic 
point of view, but less so from the economis:: point of view.  From the 
economic point of  view, genuine integration exists in the Mediterranean, 
centred above all upon the European Economic Community and in part 
upon the Arab oil-exporting countries; they in turn have relations with 
the European Community and for that reason it may be said in general 
that there exists a degree of economic integration centred on the Eu-
ropean Community's principal pole of attraction. There is  therefore a 
contradiction between the absence of a system for managing power crises 
operating, if you will, at strategic level, and the existence of a system of 
integration at economic and commercial level.  Inherent in that contra-
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the  most  obvious,  and  they  aggravate  the  defence  problems  of the 
Alliance and of Europe in the Mediterranean. 
The military situation in the Mediterranean is changing - I shall merely 
give  a  brief outline - as  a  result of the  sharp  increase  in  the tech-
nological capacity of  the Soviet Union to threaten the Mediterranean and 
to  intervene  militarily  there  (longer-range  aircraft,  a  more  efficient 
navy); the United States and the countries of Europe are finding it more 
difficult to control local conflicts and there is  therefore a risk that the 
Mediterranean will become elusive, so to speak, and that indirect threats 
may assume greater significance than direct threats, so we should think 
not so much in terms of outright world war but rather of progressive de-
stabilization and an increasing number of localized conflicts which are 
difficult to control. 
Since its inception the Atlantic Alliance has had virtually no experience 
in the Mediterranean of what we may term collective crisis management 
capacity  or,  as  the  English-speaking  people  describe  it,  'coalition 
warfare'. Apart from this lack of experience and tradition, there is a lack 
of geographical continuity between the various theatres of operations; 
there is sometimes a lack of political cooperation between a number of 
States, an exaggeration of the importance of national political priorities 
- Greece and Turkey come to mind, but we should not forget Spain and 
Portugal, countries which both have an extremely self-centred and natio-
nalistic conception of their own defence problems, which is coordinated 
to only a limited extent with that of their allies. All this means that there 
is only one element holding security together in the Mediterranean, only 
one common factor, namely the American presence. Every country has a 
direct relationship with the United States, a situation which aggravates 
the problems of political management because it heightens resentment 
and leads to more serious problems, and at the same time it impedes the 
emergence of a European consensus or a consensus between European 
allies which could in some way take the place of the consensus - should 
it cease to exist - on which the alliance with the United States is based. 
Following on from that, and moving on rapidly towards the conclusion, 
let me say that a distinction may in any case be drawn between the West-
ern Mediterranean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Security is, relatively 
speaking, better in the Western Mediterranean than in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. The problem is that of moving the strategic security axis in 
the Mediterranean eastwards,  which  is  seriously  complicated  by  the 
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political problems of the Alliance and of  the European Community in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
Can Europe play  a  role  in  all  this?  There is  certainly  a  tendency in 
Europe to pay more attention to the Mediterranean; there are a number 
of ways and means, above all  mobile forces  and greater emphasis on 
naval forces and sea-based air power, but there is also an almost total 
lack of operational integration amongst the air forces  in the Mediter-
ranean, except for  the  defence  of the individual national theatres of 
operations.  It is  also  becoming more difficult for American forces  to 
thrust eastwards in the Mediterranean in times of crisis without sub-
stantial reinforcements which, in the event of a general crisis, would 
probably not be available and in any case the fact remains that none of 
this resolves the problem of  minor crises such as terrorism and threats, or 
of minor  conflicts  which  might  give  rise  to problems  for  European 
countries; we  continue to rely upon systems of national management 
when faced  with international crises  and are therefore confronted by 
grave problems of mutual weakness and confusion. One need only look 
at relations between Italy and the United States during the Achille Lauro 
crisis or the incredible Malta incident to see how national management 
of international crises may lead to the most serious disasters, and these 
were minor crises - far more complicated and serious crises may arise. 
The trouble is  that it is  practically impossible  to solve  this problem 
simply  within  the  framework  of bilateral  relations  with  the  United 
States, again because even though one or two Mediterranean countries 
might contrive to come to a direct arrangement with the United States 
Government, it would be difficult for that arrangement to be the same 
for all the Mediterranean countries - hence their objective should be to 
establish a degree of coordination amongst the countries of Europe, at 
least those of southern Europe, and European States in general, in order 
to  achieve  more  consistent  management  and then to agree  with  the 
Americans upon· a common political line, an approach which is  very 
doubtful but which might work. The difficulties involved in such an ap-
proach derive above all from the excessively nationalistic features of atti-
tudes towards defence  and from  the ways in which the threat is  per-
ceived, which at times reach almost absurd proportions, as in the case of 
the two members of  the Atlantic Alliance who each think of one another, 
rather than of the external foe, as their worst enemy or the case of the 
country which I hope will remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance and 
which purports above all  to be a friend of the Arabs in the Mediter-
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ritory and its security is precisely the threat posed by the Arab countries. 
These are typical of the contradictions inherent in national perceptions 
of security; they are a hangover, if you like, from the situation and the 
anarchy  which  previously  existed  in  the  Mediterranean  and  which 
perhaps Europe could help to eliminate. 
* 
*  * 
Questions were put by: 
Mr Ephremidis (COM, GR), Mr Penders (EPP, NL), Mr Flanagan (RDE, IRL), 
Mr Mallet (EPP, F), Mr Amadei (S, 1), Mr Segre (COM, 1), Mr Newens (S, UK), 
Mr Cicciomessere (NI, I) and Mrs Piermont (ARC, D). 
In  his  replies  Professor  Silvestri  first  expressecj  the  view  that Mediterranean 
memories of historical national antagonisms might stretch too far back; he ad-
mitted that this was difficult to overcome, but regarded the whole thing as fairly 
pointless. He referred to Jean Monnet and the foundation of the ECSC, describ-
ing Europe as the best means of resolving disputes. Asked about the dispute be-
tween Greece and Turkey, he described Turkey as historically on the offensive, 
but felt that Greece was also going too far. 
However, a solution to this and other endogenous problems required willingness 
to compromise. 
Asked about the key role of the USA, Professor Silvestri favoured action by the 
European NATO countries, as the question of nuclear weapons was less impor-
tant in the Mediterranean. 
The possible effects of EEC enlargement on non-Community countries (e.  g. 
Morocco) had to be considered, as they might have repercussions on Spain, for 
example. Adjustments to trade arrangements were not enough. Economic crises 
could spread and escalate. A comprehensive Mediterranean policy was required. 
This idea lay at the root of the Euro-Arab dialogue, which had unfortunately 
petered out. 
In reply to a question on Malta, Professor Silvestri said that the situation was not 
ideal, but could improve, especially after Minto££. 
It was unrealistic to expect a solution to the Middle East problem with the PLO 
as a partner, as the latter's organization was too weak. He preferred to involve 
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could solve the present problems, but did not rule out positive efforts. He did feel 
that a more flexible Israeli approach was required first. 
Europe would finally have to adopt a political stance, and certainly assume more 
responsibilities;  the  Community  could  not  remain  the  dominant  power  in 
economic terms only. 
Examining the narrower security policy aspects, Professor Silvestri felt that the 
Warsaw Pact countries had increased their presence since 1977. At the moment 
this was not a direct challenge, but could hamper or interrupt NATO's logistics. 
On a question on the SDI, Professor Silvestri regarded the present situation as far 
less acute than it was six months previously. At all events there had to be a com-
mon  (Western)  European solution to  the  problem of technical  cooperation. 
There was a dearth of significant European projects, and he felt that in its present 
form Eureka was fairly pointless. 
In his opinion the Community was regarded by non-EEC countries simply as a 
channel for contacting the Americans. The Community would remain an inter-
mediary until EPC was intensified and it had a genuine security policy. He felt 
that an industrial development policy should be one of the short-term aims, and 
he wanted above all to see protectionism pushed back. 
64 Statement by Professor Constantin Vlad 
Director of the IPS 
(Romanian Institute of Political Science), Bucharest 
The present-day situation in Europe makes more acute than ever the ne-
cessity to ensure the security of all States, to achieve security and peace 
on the Continent. This goal of ensuring security and peace requires a 
close  and  many-sided  cooperation  between  States,  groups  of States, 
among peoples.  This is  the perspective in which I view,  in my intro-
ductory paper, cooperation, including cooperation between East and 
West. 
I believe that such cooperation is both necessary and entirely feasible. It 
is necessary because, as has been proved by the whole postwar history, a 
lasting and viable system of security cannot be built on confrontation, 
on a policy of force and armaments. At any rate, European security can-
not be the result of imposing the will of some States or groups of States 
upon the rest of the States on the Continent. It can only be the effect of 
agreement and common action of all  European States. Such an agree-
ment and common action of  the European States, of all the signatories of 
the Helsinki Final Act can only result from their cooperation, a coopera-
tion between independent and sovereign States enjoying equal rights. 
This cooperation is, at the same time, perfectly feasible.  An analysis of 
the realities on the Continent reveals that the European States, all the 
States participating in  the CSCE  process, have certain common basic 
interests pertaining to security. Indeed, such common security interests 
exist in spite of the differences between the European States provided by 
their size, social and political order, by their belonging or not to military 
alliances, etc. Objectively speaking, the fate of security and peace unites 
the countries and peoples on the Continent, as does the prospect of their 
continued existence in a Europe, in a world, able to halt the arms race, in 
particular the nuclear arms race, and to maintain peace; or, on the con-
trary, they may face the same fate - the alternative of being destroyed, 
of being annihilated in case a nuclear conflict breaks out. Without these 
common security interests, the initiation  and follow-up  of the CSCE 
process, would have been inconceivable. Moreover, without these com-
mon interests, all hopes connected with the establishment of a system of 
65 security on the Continent should be given up. I refer to a system in which 
States would feel  protected from interferences and pressures, from ag-
gression, a system capable to meet the security requirements of different 
groups of States,  to secure  all  peoples on the Continent the right to 
choose freely their way to development. 
A broad and systematic cooperation directed toward accomplishing the 
goals of security is also facilitated by the existence in international life of 
numerous  frameworks  within which  such  cooperation can  be  imple-
mented. Among these frameworks I mention: bilateral contacts between 
the States of the Continent, between all the States participating in the 
CSCE process, contacts that actually constitute a broad and systematic 
dialogue; the joint actions of these States within the UN, on matters aim-
ing at strengthening international security, taking into account the fact 
that European security is  a  component of world security;  the CSCE 
process  with  all  its  institutionalized  forms:  the  follow-up  meetings, 
reunions, experts' meetings, etc.; and others. 
I consider that a study of the possibilities for cooperation in ensuring 
security on the Continent should start with a thorough analysis of Eu-
ropean and world realities, with a dear-sighted understanding of the 
trends in evolution of these realities in an attempt to reach conclusions 
on the ways of action meant to curb the negative processes and to en-
courage positive evolutions which are beneficial to achieving the objec-
tives of security. 
Such an analysis highlights the fact that, in the latest years, the interna-
tional situation has worsened very seriously. Although the world is -
according to the figures provided by numerous research institutes spe-
cializing in contemporary military phenomena - over-saturated with 
arms, the arms race - in particular the nuclear arms race - continues at 
higher and higher levels. Military expenditures increase year by year, ef-
forts  are  intensified  to  create,  produce  and  introduce  new  types  of 
weapons and arms systems, including nuclear weapons and other arms 
of mass destruction. Efforts are made for militarization of outer space. 
Such evolutions and especially the prospect of a new escalation of the 
arms race worries public opinion. 
Dangerous threats hover over Europe. The largest forces of annihilation 
ever known in history are concentrated on our Continent. It is here that 
the  two  main military-political  alliances  - NATO and the Warsaw 
Treaty- confront each other. Under the circumstances, deployment of 
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weapons, increases enormously the nuclear danger. 
While the arms race continues and even intensifies, the use of force and 
the threat of force, the struggle for maintenance and redivision of the 
spheres of influence, the pressures and interferences in internal affairs of 
States do not constitute isolated phenomena, but manifestations of cer-
tain policies in international life. Under these circumstances, the preoc-
cupation of States, including different groups of States, with ensuring 
their own security is altogether legitimate. 
Security presupposes a balance of forces between States, between diffe-
rent  groups  of States.  In  Romania's  view  such  a  balance  should  be 
achieved at lower levels of armaments, by slowing down the arms race 
and through adoption of effective disarmament measures, first of all in 
the field of nuclear disarmament. This Romanian stand - which is con-
current with positions adopted by numerous other States - materializes 
one of the main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the whole 
postwar history. Namely, the idea that all attempts to achieve a balance 
'at higher levels', through new ascending spirals in the development of 
armaments, have stepped up the arms race, transforming it more and 
more in a factor of instability and insecurity. 
This  is  not all.  As  has  been  warned more and more often  by  clear-
sighted  politicians,  by  numerous  scientists  of world  renown  and  by 
prestigious institutions and scientific forums - both in East and in West 
-the continuation of the arms race at a time when a huge, a horrible 
overkill capacity has been amassed on both sides, creates serious dangers 
not only for stability, for  security and peace;  a war in which nuclear 
weapons are used - and a world war would inevitably be an all-out 
nuclear war - would mean the destruction of human civilization, the 
annihilation of the conditions of life on Earth. 
That  is  why  the  warnings  against  the  nuclear  danger,  against  the 
continuation and increase of the arms race should be viewed as a true 
memento mori for  mankind.  In  this light, the statement in  the Final 
Document of the 1Oth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, de-
dicated to disarmament to the effect that: 'Mankind is confronted with a 
choice; we must end the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face 
annihilation', is  not mere rhetoric, but represents a  solemn appeal to 
reason, to decided action. 
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could destroy human civilization, man's and people's right to life  and 
existence has become one of the basic human rights. This right pertains 
- to the same extent - to all peoples in all States whose conditions for 
life would be denied, destroyed, should a nuclear catastrophe take place. 
I want to underline the special significance this right acquires for  the 
peoples of small and medium-size countries, even for those of  large ones, 
as they all are potential victims of a nuclear conflict waged mainly by the 
more powerfully armed States. 
In general, the dear-sighted, realist and responsible analysis of  the evolu-
tion  of  international  relations,  including  the  relations  among  the 
European countries, shows that, under the conditions of an increased 
interdependence between military and non-military factors threatening 
the security of States, the arms race has a negative effect on interstate re-
lations as a whole. 
The policy of armaments poisons the international atmosphere, feeds 
distrust  between  States  and peoples,  and comes  altogether into  con-
tradiction with the requirements of establishing international relations 
founded on respect for the principles of independence and sovereignty, 
equality in  rights,  non-interference  in  internal affairs,  repudiation of 
force  and the threat of force, of the peaceful settlement of all interna-
tional differences. 
Armaments impede economic development of all States, the European 
States being no exception in this respect. At a time when the resources 
mankind has at its disposal are inevitably limited, when mankind is con-
fronted  with  numerous  and  serious  global  problems  - overcoming 
underdevelopment, securing the means for development like energy, raw 
materials, financial means, eradication of famine, endemic diseases, illi-
teracy, etc., the arms race represents an intolerable waste of resources. It 
drastically reduces the capacity of the international community to suc-
cessfully  meet  a  series  of challenges which  might  have  unpredictable 
consequences for international stability, security and peace. 
Placing - to a large extent - scientific and technical progress under its 
control, the arms race diverts science from its natural purpose, turning 
brilliant achievements of the human spirit against man.  It hinders the 
concentration of material and human resources toward the promotion of 
new, top technologies for civilian purposes. 
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day situation in the world and on the European continent. They could 
serve a as starting point in identifying the possibilities for cooperation -
including East-West cooperation - in the achievement of security in 
Europe. I shall attempt next to identify these possibilities. Of course, in 
view of the character and size of this introductory paper the presentation 
of the possibilities of cooperation will - inevitably - be limited and its 
main purpose will be to stimulate an exchange of ideas on this topic. 
It  is  my  opinion that cooperation on matters of security  among the 
European States, among all the States participating in the CSCE process, 
should concentrate on cardinal aspects of the efforts which should be 
undertaken to ensure security and peace on the Continent and in the 
whole world. In concrete terms, such cooperation can have a real impact 
toward achieving security and peace only if it is focused on decisive mat-
ters,  namely  halting  the  arms  race  and initiation  of a  disarmament 
process, first of all in the field of nuclear weapons. 
This view about cooperation on security-related issues ensues from the 
general conception Romania promotes according to which security and 
peace can only be achieved as a result of the joint efforts made by all cat-
egories of States, small, medium and large, by all dear-sighted, realist 
forces in the world. Peace and security can only be secured as a result of 
cooperation, on an equal footing, of all categories of States, and taking 
into account their security interests. 
Materializing her conception on disarmament issues- the sure, radical 
way of building the security of States, of achieving international security, 
Romania stated in a position document distributed at the UN in 197  5: 
'Romania starts out from the premise that disarmament issues concern 
not only a small group of States and governments, but are of vital inter-
est for all the States and peoples in the world, large or small, irrespective 
of their military might and the types of weapons they own. It is an im-
perative that all States participate in the disarmament negotiations in the 
debate and adoption of measures in this field; the right of each State to 
defend its legitimate interests of security and development, within any 
such negotiations, should be secured.' 
Of course, while underlining the requirement that all States participate in 
the halting of the arms race we do not diminish the responsibility the 
main military powers have in achieving disarmament. On the contrary, 
as  the  two  main  military  powers  own  almost  all  nuclear  weapons, 
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ticular responsibility is incumbent upon them in halting the arms race, in 
the first place the nuclear arms race. 
Precisely-to this effect, the Romanian draft for the 'Declaration on Dis-
armament' of the Special Session of the UN General Assembly dedicated 
to  disarmament  (  1978)  included  among  the  basic  principles  which 
should guide the disarmament negotiations 'securing absolute priority to 
measures of nuclear disarmament' and 'initiation of the disarmament 
process by the militarily significant States'. 
In fact, in Romania's view and practical action, the responsibility of the 
big nuclear-weapon States and the requirement that all States participate 
in the tackling and solving of security issues are complementary, they do 
not contradict each other. 
The same spirit prevails in the above-mentioned document, in all subse-
quent Romanian proposals presented at the two special sessions of the 
UN General Assembly dedicated to disarmament, in different UN ne-
gotiations forums, as well as in the CSCE process. 
I believe that it is precisely in this perspective that the issues of coopera-
tion between the States signatories of the Final Act, a cooperation con-
ducive to European security, should be approached. 
I will refer next to the consideration Romania has given and gives to the 
role different Soviet-American negotiations on issues of nuclear arma-
ments in Europe can play, at the same time promoting ideas and initia-
tives meant to stir to action, to cooperation toward stopping the arms 
race on the Continent, all European States. 
Thus, while welcoming, like  other States, the opening,  in November 
1981, of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on stopping de-
ployment  and  the  withdrawal  of medium-range  nuclear  weapons  in 
Europe, Romania has insisted that all States signatories of the Helsinki 
Final Act should participate - in a way or another - in those negotia-
tions. 
When in the fall of 1983, in the circumstances that are known, these ne-
gotiations were  about to fail,  Romania proposed - several  times -
measures meant to create conditions for their continuation and for their 
successful conclusion. 
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work being done for the deployment of the American missiles in Europe; 
storing in silos  of the missiles  already transported in some  European 
countries; cessation of transportation of other such  missiles  from  the 
USA. At the same time, a proposal was made that the Soviet Union give 
up the steps it announced (the countermeasures and its walking out on 
the negotiations), and all preparations for deployment of new medium-
range nuclear weapons. Romania has requested that the USA and the So-
viet Union resume the Geneva negotiations with a view to reach a gen-
eral agreement leading to a halt on the deployment of new medium-range 
missiles, the withdrawal and destruction of the existing ones. 
A point I want to stress is that as early as November 1983 Romania has 
suggested  that  a  meeting  be  convened  between  the  Soviet  and  the 
American Foreign Ministers and also has advanced the idea of a Soviet-
American high-level meeting to be prepared and held as early as possible 
in 1984. 
At the same time, keeping in mind the fact that the issue of the medium-
range nuclear weapons is a matter of concern for the countries belonging 
to  both  military  alliances,  for  all  European countries,  Romania  has 
deemed necessary the convening- as early as 1983-of a consultative 
meeting  of the  Foreign  Ministers  of the  NATO and of the Warsaw 
Treaty countries. Romania has also suggested that, in parallel with the 
Soviet-American negotiations in  Geneva a consultative meeting of the 
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries be held. The meeting was sup-
posed to discuss the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and the 
USA  and to make a contribution toward reaching an agreement in the 
Soviet-American  negotiations  in  Geneva  on  medium-range  nuclear 
weapons in Europe. 
Several  weeks later, the idea  of the contribution the other European 
States could make in curbing a new spiral in the nuclear arms race on 
the Continent has been expressed in a Joint Declaration signed by the 
President of Romania Nicolae Ceau~escu and the Greek Prime Minister 
Andreas Papandreou. 
In the aforementioned Declaration the two sides state that 'in order to 
halt the worsening of the situation on the Continent and in the world all 
European States- particularly the countries belonging to the two mili-
tary alliances - should take a more active stand and make a  contribu-
tion - in one form or another - to reaching adequate agreements'. 
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the idea of negotiations as means of stopping the dangerous course to-
ward tension  and confrontation and resuming  and consolidating the 
course  toward  detente.  Like  other  States,  she  duly  appreciated  the 
opening of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and 
outer-space  weapons.  Also,  the  meeting  of 19-21  November  1985, 
between the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mihail 
Gorbachev  and the President of the USA,  Ronald Reagan, has been 
considered,  in  Romania,  a  positive  event,  of high  relevance  in  the 
existing circumstances. 
I would mention that in an appeal of the Romanian Parliament addres-
sed to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA, on the eve of their 
meeting, hope was expressed that they would act with the utmost re-
sponsibility to reach '. . . a mutually acceptable agreement leading to a 
reduction in nuclear armaments- on both sides-, to a halt in the de-
ployment  and the  withdrawal  of medium-range  nuclear  weapons  in 
Europe, to putting an end to militarization of outer space, to resuming 
the policy of mutual trust, detente and peaceful cooperation'. I would 
remind you also that together with the non-aligned countries, Romania 
has initiated the appeal of the UN General Assembly addressed, on the 
same occasion, to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA. 
At the same time, Romania continued to follow a line of conduct aimed 
at promoting all-European cooperation in halting the arms race, in parti-
cular the nuclear arms race, in Europe. 
In this spirit, Romania has repeatedly stated that the European States 
should not wait passively while the Soviet-American  negotiations are 
carried on and the meeting between the leaders of the two countries takes 
place. On the contrary, these States, in particular those that belong to 
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, should bear a higher direct responsibi-
lity, should act more vigorously to convince the two big nuclear-weapon 
States  to take concrete steps  leading  to a  mutually acceptable  agree-
ment. Romania has considered and considers that all peoples, in parti-
cular those of Europe, should take decisive  action for the removal of 
long-range nuclear weapons and, subsequently, of all nuclear weapons, 
before proceeding to effective disarmament measures, to the general re-
duction of troops and armaments, to preventing the militarization of 
outer space. 
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have  concluded  with  a  series  of positive  results.  In  fact,  the  very 
convening of this meeting and the adoption of the Joint Declaration are 
important  events  in  the  existing  international  situation.  Romanian 
public opinion has nourished hopes that this meeting will bring about the 
decision by the two nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, in par-
ticular the nuclear arms race. 
However, the basic problems have not been solved.  Under these cir-
cumstances, a number of questions are being asked in  Romania con-
cerning the future evolution of events.  Namely, will the arms race be 
stopped or will it continue? Will the deployment of medium-range and 
other nuclear weapons be halted or will it be continued in Europe? Will 
nuclear-weapon  testing  cease  or  will  it  continue?  Will  the  military 
budgets of the two big nuclear powers be reduced or will they continue 
to grow? 
In fact, in Romania the prospect of whipping up the arms race is a matter 
of deep concern, as it represents the most serious danger for the whole 
mankind. 
It would be logical - in our opinion - that while negotiations are being 
conducted in Geneva, the production, testing and deployment of new 
nuclear weapons should be ceased, as well as any actions aiming at the 
militarization of outer space. 
In general, Romania considers that the Soviet-American high-level meet-
ing will acquire a real historic significance, fulfilling mankind's expecta-
tions of progress toward the goal of disarmament and peace, only if the 
two parties can reach - as soon as possible - mutually acceptable agree-
ments conducive to nuclear disarmament. 
In view of the present international situation, Romania considers that ef-
forts should be intensified by all States, by all peoples for strengthening 
security and peace in Europe and in the whole world. 
Under these circumstances, a meeting of the States belonging to the two 
military alliances- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty- seems more ne-
cessary than ever, as well as the multiplication of the joint actions of all 
European States meant to halt the armaments, to implement the goals of 
security. 
I have offered for consideration these views and actions undertaken by 
Romania as I think that such a perspective on the relationship existing 
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European States is capable to promote cooperation between all the States 
participating in the CSCE process in achieving the goals of security on 
the Continent. 
I mean a cooperation not directed against the actions undertaken by mili-
tarily significant countries, but aiming at supplementing these actions 
with the active participation of all European States in the debate and so-
lution of the problems pertaining to their security, to the security of the 
Continent. In other words, a cooperation which does not oppose the spe-
cial responsibility incumbent upon the militarily significant States to the 
inalienable and untransmissible right of all other States to be concerned 
with their own security. 
There also exist - in my opinion - real possibilities to cooperate in 
stopping the increase in military expenditures, in freezing and reducing 
the military budgets. This cooperation - like cooperation in other fields 
- could take place both within the CSCE process and within the more 
general efforts undertaken in the UN framework. 
When contending that there are possibilities of  cooperation for the freeze 
and reduction of military expenditures I start from the premise that there 
exist a series of circumstances conducive to the achievement of such an 
objective. 
For instance, the European States are interested not to increase the bur-
den of military expenditures, but to lessen it. The validity of this argu-
ment is enhanced by the ever increasing cost of armaments. In fact, all 
the  countries of the Continent are facing economic problems. I believe 
that the interest to use the resources released from armaments for solving 
these problems could be an important factor favouring cooperation of 
European States in this field. 
As far as Romania is concerned, our interest is genuine to diminish the 
resources earmarked for national defence,  reallocating the funds thus 
saved for the country's economic development, for the steady rising of 
the people's material and spiritual standard of living. In fact, Romania 
spends less than other countries on national defence. For instance, in the 
current budget 3.3°/o  is  earmarked for national defence.  I would also 
mention that, after unilaterally reducing her military expenditures in 
several consecutive years, Romania has decided to freeze  them at the 
level of those  recorded in 1982 for the duration of the present five-year 
plan, that is up to the end of 1985. 
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understanding of the serious dangers that the unbridled military com-
petition taking place in Europe pose for the Continent: the prospect of 
unleashing, on its territory, a conflict which - under the present condi-
tions of armaments - could not be limited to a conventional confronta-
tion  - as  numerous  highly  authoritative  studies  have  duly  dem-
onstrated. 
The same circumstances could stimulate the understanding of the necess-
ity to replace the existing 'pattern' of the ways for achieving the balance 
of forces on the Continent. As long as an overkill capacity exists on both 
sides, both at the strategic, global and at the continental levels, the futil-
ity of and the risks associated with the search for a balance of forces at 
higher and higher levels of armaments is altogether obvious. 
If  the conclusion is reached that States' security, European security and 
general security should not be sought in the continuation but in the halt-
ing of the arms race, then the freeze and reduction of military expendi-
tures could be placed in a new, more feasible, perspective. For the limita-
tion and, all the more so, the cessation of all activities could lead to are-
duction in military expenditures. In its turn, this reduction could act as a 
lever for slowing down and ultimately stopping the process of develop-
ment of new weapons. 
I believe that there exist, indeed, possibilities of cooperation between 
States for stopping expenditures.  The proposals put forth in different 
stages of the CSCE process, by a series of participating States, including 
the Conference now being held in Stockholm, are particularly relevant in 
this respect. Mention should also be made of the proposals submitted at 
the UN, in the special and ordinary sessions of the General Assembly, at · 
the UN Conference on disarmament, as well as the cooperative actions 
of different States- including European ones- in the adoption of UN 
resolutions calling on States to stop and reduce military expenditures. 
I would mention in this respect the initiative of Sweden concerning the 
reporting by States of military expenditures under the form of a matrix. 
Romania has been co-author in this initiative. Also, Romania submitted 
a draft concerning the principles which should govern the actions of 
States  directed  toward  freezing  and  reducing  military  expenditures. 
Sweden became co-author of this Romanian proposal. 
I think it realistic to assume that, on the basis of  the recent decision of  the 
UN Disarmament Commission and through the joint efforts of States, 
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tion of military expenditures can be accelerated and concluded, with a 
view  to opening concrete negotiations meant to lead to international 
agreements in this field. I do not doubt that European States can muster 
up their initiative resources in reaching these goals. 
I want to mention in the same line of thought that Romania is among the 
13 UN member States that have submitted to the UN the figures of their 
1984 military expenditures, in keeping with the recommendation in Re-
solution 39/64B (Doc. A/40 1313, 20 May 1985). 
Broad  possibilities  for  cooperation  among  European  States  exist 
concerning  abandoning  force  and  the  threat  of force,  strengthening 
confidence and promotion of a policy of settlement of differences be-
tween States by peaceful means. 
Certainly, there are relatively few  situations of tension and conflict in 
Europe, though some of these do not exclude the risks of a military con-
frontation, of a concrete manifestation of the policy of force.  What is 
really essential is the fact that the Continent's general condition is being 
marked by the continuation and intensification of the arms race includ-
ing the nuclear competition, by the confrontation between the two mi-
litary alliances, two factors that give rise to serious dangers for peace and 
security on the Continent and in the whole world. I have presented above 
some considerations in this regard. Now I just want to underline that 
armaments and the policy of confrontation represent the most explosive 
manifestation of the policy of force,  of the potential danger of a war 
breaking out in Europe and in the whole world. 
This situation justifies the deep concern in countries of Europe, both 
East and West, as well as in the entire world, and the intense preoccupa-
tions of different States with ensuring repudiation of force and the threat 
to use force among the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, both 
in their mutual relations and, in general, in their international relations. 
I will recall in this respect the fact that, as a result of  the preoccupation of 
the participating States, of the efforts undertaken by them - and among 
them Romania played a very active role - the Helsinki Final Act in-
scribes the non-recourse to force or to the threat of force among the prin-
ciples  which  should govern the mutual relations  among participating 
States.  Now,  as  it  is  known,  following  certain  positive  evolutions, 
chances  are  that  agreements  may  be  reached  in  this  respect  in  the 
Stockholm Conference. 
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the proposals submitted by Romania, the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization concerning the conclusion of a Treaty on mutual non-use 
of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations among the States 
participating in the two military alliances. This Treaty should be open to 
all European countries, as well as to all other interested States. This pro-
posal has been recently reiterated by the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 
its Declaration of Sofia. 
Important avenues for cooperation on matters of security are opened by 
alternatives to the policy of force.  Such alternatives are real, provided 
that the arms race is stopped and disarmament measures, first of all in 
the field  of nuclear weapons, are  undertaken.  They consist in imple-
mentation of a whole series of measures aiming at building confidence 
and understanding, at removing suspicion in the relations among States, 
and the peaceful settlement of all disputes between States. 
Indeed, agreement on and implementation of confidence-building meas-
ures (  CBM) requires cooperation and, in tum, these measures could sub-
stantially  stimulate  cooperation  between  States  on  security-related 
matters. 
I recall in this respect the fact that throughout the CSCE process, the 
matter of  defining and adoption of such measures was given  much atten-
tion.  In  fact,  the very  contents of the CBMs,  in their acknowledged 
meaning, was established in this process, during the first all-European 
Conference. 
The Helsinki Final Act included few CBMs.  However, the very nume-
rous proposals advanced by the participating States concerning military 
aspects of security, the debates they occasioned have marked important 
progress in the understanding of the confidence issue, of the measures 
which could lead to building this confidence. The discussions were not 
mere  academic-diplomatic  exercises.  They  approached  important 
aspects of the relations among participating States, expressing the States' 
genuine concern with ensuring their security, the security of the whole 
Continent. 
The contents of the CBMs concept was enriched at the Madrid meeting, 
which adopted the acronym CSBM  for confidence-building measures. 
This  fact  and  particularly  the  convening  of  the  CSBM  Con-
ference in Stockholm stand for the progress made in this field within the 
CSCE process. 
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ce at the UN particularly at the special sessions of the UN General As-
sembly dedicated to disarmament, as  well  as  in different negotiations 
conducted within the UN or in other forums and, last but not least, the 
interest attached to CBMs in bilateral contacts between the States of the 
Continent. 
Romania considers that CBMs can play an important role in the process 
of building European security. The fact that they are  directly related to 
the security interests of all  States facilitates their approach within the 
existing multilateral frameworks,  it allows the identification, through 
joint efforts, through cooperation, of the areas where the States' con-
cerns with their security meet, it helps harmonize positions, facilitating 
compromise and agreement. 
Expanding the CBMs agreed upon and implemented by European States 
could  be  - in  our opinion  - an  important  factor  contributing  to 
strengthen security, to develop the States' cooperation in this field. At the 
same time, any progress in this direction enriches the substance of the 
military issue on the Continent which is approached and will - hope-
fully- be solved with participation of all European States. This has a 
particular importance for the cooperation among States, enhancing the 
significance of cooperation for European security. 
According to Romania's conception embodied in the Romanian propos-
als, CBMs have a rich contents and a wide range. They aim at meeting 
the  objective  requirements  of building  confidence  and security,  they 
contribute to implementation of military disengagement, to make effec-
tive the non-recourse to force and to the threat of force, they pave the 
way for undertaking concrete disarmament measures. 
In various instances - both within the CSCE, including the Stockholm 
Conference, and at the special sessions of the UN General Assembly de-
dicated to disarmament - Romania has proposed a series of confidence-
building measures such as the following: 
(i)  prohibition of multinational military manoeuvres carried on near 
the borders of other States; 
(ii)  establishment of border zones, 100-150 km wide, in which large 
concentrations of troops and armaments are  prohibited, only the 
stationing of small military units being permitted; 
(iii)  compulsory notification of all major military manoeuvres carried 
on land, water and in the air; 
78 (iv)  compulsory notification of a state of military alertness if it involves 
national troops or foreign troops stationed on the country's ter-
ritory; 
(  v)  establishment of an information flow which should contripute to 
the solution of crisis situations; 
(vi)  reduction, and finally, withdrawal of foreign troops from the ter-
ritories of other States within national borders; 
(vii)  liquidation of military bases from the territory of other States; 
(viii) reduction of  military budgets, starting with the budgets of big, mili-
tarily significant countries; 
(ix)  gradual reduction of troops and armaments from national military 
forces; 
(x)  establishment  of nuclear-weapon-free  zones  in  various  parts of 
Europe and the pledge undertaken by nuclear-weapon States not to 
use nuclear weapons against the States participating in such zones; 
(xi)  securing the conditions for dismantlement of  military alliances and, 
finally, for their simultaneous liquidation. 
For Romania such measures do not represent mere proposals submitted 
in various international forums.  They are, at the same time, effective 
stands in her policy, actions that express and implement her policy·.  I 
have  mentioned above  some of these  actions, for instance  Romania's 
stand  on military  budgets,  on establishment  of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones, on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.  I could 
also add that Romania rigorously implements the CBMs agreed upon at 
all- European conferences.  On our national territory no foreign  bases 
or troops are  stationed.  Romania does  not accept multinational ma-
noeuvres to be held on her territory and does not participate in such 
manoeuvres on the territory of other States with the exception of certain 
general staff exercises.  Attached to her national values, prizing parti-
cularly those principles that promote the nations' free development and 
assertion, the Romanian foreign policy is based on consistent observance 
of the unanimously agreed upon norms of international relations, any 
kind of manifestation of force, of interference in internal affairs of other 
countries being alien to its line of action. 
By nature of the problems that it intends to solve, cooperation in the field 
of repudiation of force and the threat with force is interconnected with 
cooperation for the promotion of the principle of and the establishment 
of the structures, of the mechanisms for peaceful settlement, through ne-
gotiations, of every differences between States. This has been the spirit 
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at the UN, it is the spirit numerous States throughout the world have 
adopted as line of action. 
I mention in this respect the complementary character of the Romanian 
proposals made within the CSCE aimed to render effective the non-re-
course to force and of the proposal submitted by Switzerland concerning 
the  adoption of a  'draft convention on establishment of a  European 
system for peaceful settlement of disputes'. The discussion of this draft 
and of the whole question in the experts' meetings  in Montreux and 
Athens  allowed  not only the  thorough  consideration  of the  issue  of 
peaceful settlement of differences, but also expansion and deepening of 
cooperation in this field among participating States. 
I would also refer to Romania's initiatives at the UN already materialized 
in the adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on peaceful 
settlement of international differences (15  November 1982) as well as 
the proposal concerning the establishment of a commission for good-
offices, mediation and conciliation which is still under consideration by 
the world organization. I would also mention that, on Romania's initia-
tive,  the  UN General  Assembly  adopted - at its  40th  session  - a 
solemn appeal to belligerent States urging them to stop without delay 
military actions and to proceed to solving their problems by means of 
negotiations. On the same occasion a pledge by UN member States was 
adopted to the effect that they would solve the situations of tension and 
conflict, all existing differences, by political means, and would refrain 
from using force and the threat of force, and from any interferences in 
internal affairs of other States. 
Another  field  of cooperation might  be  the  establishment of nuclear-
weapon-free zones in different parts of Europe, conceived as compo-
nents of the security of the whole continent, as possible steps toward a 
general process of disarmament. Establishment of such zones in the Bal-
kans, in the northern part of Europe, in the central part of  the Continent 
- along the separation line between the two military alliances - would 
signify,  by their nature, achieving both effective measures of disarma-
ment und measures of building confidence  and understanding among 
States. 
I consider that particular attention should be given, in the light of our 
arguments here, to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
central Europe. The establishment of such a zone would have a special 
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velopment of a suitable cooperation among European States, of all States 
participating in the CSCE process, in attaining this objective. 
In connection with nuclear-weapon-free zones I would highlight a pecu-
liarity of the Romanian proposal concerning the Balkan area, a proposal 
advanced as early as  1957 and recently reiterated. The Romanian ap-
proach concerning the establishment in the Balkans of a good-neigh-
bourhood-relations zone,  a  zone  of cooperation  and peace,  without 
nuclear weapons and foreign military bases, has broad, comprehensive 
contents. Such a view about the Balkan area is - in my opinion - able 
to correlate closely security and cooperation - in political, economic, 
scientific,  cultural  and  other  fields.  Thus,  cooperation  in  different 
spheres becomes a factor stimulating cooperation among Balkan States 
in matters related to security proper both of each Balkan State and of  the 
whole area. In fact, the deepening of  the relations of cooperation-both 
bilateral and multilateral - among the Balkan States gives legal force to 
the viability and efficiency of such an approach to the security interests 
of States and the ways of ensuring them. 
Finally, among the directions that cooperation for security among the 
States participating in the CSCE could take, as an overall outcome of  this 
cooperation, I would refer to the goal of creating a united Europe. 
The creation of a united Europe cannot take place by denying but by 
acknowledging  the  diversity  of  conditions  in  different  European 
countries, diversity given by social systems, by different forms of orga-
nization  of economic  and  social-political  life,  by  different  cultural 
values. 
The foundations of a United Europe rest- on one hand- in the con-
sciousness of the common history of the Continent as a whole. I agree in 
this respect  with  Sir  Geoffrey Howe, the UK  Foreign Secretary who 
stated last June in The Hague: 'My visit to five East-European countries 
in the first half of 1985 have brought home to me with fresh force that all 
Europeans, East and West, have a common heritage' (Europe Tomor-
row). These bases rest, on the other hand, in the security interests, ac-
tual and prospective, of all European States. 
Such  a Europe can only be achieved as a result of a wide cooperation 
among all  States, a cooperation based on the principles of equality in 
rights, national independence and sovereignty, abandoning force and the 
threat to use force,  non-interference in internal affairs, as  well  as  on 
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sistent observance of the right of every  people to freely  choose their 
system of social development, to freely determine their own destiny. 
Based on such foundations, cooperation among European countries can 
be expanded in all fields- in economic development, in commercial ex-
changes, in industrial production, also for the promotion of technical-
scientific progress, in education, culture, human contacts, contacts be-
tween peoples. The strict observance - in the relations among the States 
participating in the CSCE process - of the 'Decalogue' in the Helsinki 
Final Act, could lead to the development of a spirit of cooperation, and 
would eliminate  the  confrontation situations now existing in certain 
fields which also require cooperation and mutual respect. 
Under the circumstances, cooperation among European States can be 
widely expanded both for the purpose of economic and social develop-
ment of every people and for keeping up and increasing the lasting con-
tribution that Europe can make to the general progress of  mankind. For, 
we consider that Europe - a cradle of modern civilization - can and 
should  continue  to play  a  significant  role  in  promoting  progress  in 
science,  in  top  technologies,  that  is  economic,  social  and  cultural 
progress of mankind, as a whole. 
Building a lasting system of security and cooperation on the Continent 
would increase the role Europe has to play in international life. Europe 
could be 'more than an air conditioning system in the relations between 
the  superpowers'  as  Hans-Dietrich  Genscher,  the  Federal  Foreign 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, put it recently in an inter-
view in Der Spiegel (No 32/1985). He mentioned that he was referring 
to the whole continent of Europe. 
The cooperation among European States, among all the States participat-
ing in the CSCE process on security-related matters is taking place under 
the circumstance of the continued existence on the Continent of the two 
military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. 
As I have shown above, considering the responsibilities incumbent on the 
States members of these two alliances, Romania deems that these States 
can and should act together for stopping the arms race, in particular nuc-
lear competition, on the Continent. In general, Romania considers that 
the political role of consultation and negotiation of the two alliances 
should be expanded, at the same time reducing their military activities. 
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taneous dismantlement of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. 
As a matter of principle, Romania considers that the future of European 
security, the prospects of a united Europe and of world security and 
peace do not lie in the continuation of military alliances, but in setting 
Europe - and the whole world - free from nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction,  in  general from  any means for waging 
war. Implementation of disarmament measures on the Continent and in 
the world should be associated - in Romania's view - with a profound 
restructuring  of  international  political  relations  which  means 
abandoning force  and the threat to use  force,  firmly  establishing the 
principles and norms of international law in the relations among States, 
development of a broad and multilateral cooperation among countries 
and peoples. 
Viewed from the angle of cooperation among European States, among 
all  States participating in  the CSCE  process, the creation of a united 
Europe is not directed against anyone. 'I consider- underlined in this 
sense the President of Romania Nicolae Ceau~escu- that Europe can 
engage in a more independent activity and develop a policy of her own in 
the  solution of many international problems.  I  consider this  activity 
should not be directed against one or the other of the two superpowers, 
but it should consist of a cooperation with them on equal footing and of 
a policy of her own representing a contribution to general peace, to ~ 
more vigorous development of each nation's life, to securing a lasting 
peace in the whole world' (interview in the Toronto Star,  1 December 
1983). 
He  suggested  cooperation,  not confrontation  in  this  direction,  too. 
Therefore,  all  positive,  predictable  and  desirable  evolutions  on  the 
Continent can be and actually are the outcome of cooperation among the 
Continent's  States,  among  all  the  States  participating  in  the  CSCE 
process. It is precisely in this spirit that Romania has acted and acts con-
sidering  that in  this  way  it can  contribute  to  building  security  and 
cooperation in Europe, a Europe permitting all peoples to develop and 
flourish freely, enjoying alike the benefits of security, peace and prosper-
ity. 
* 
*  * 
83 Replying to questions by Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr Wedekind (EPP, FRG), 
Mr Seeler  (Soc.,  FRG), Mr Efrimidis (Com., Greece)  and Mr Newens (Soc., 
UK), Professor Vlad said that the concept of a nuclear-free zone was primarily 
political, and could contribute to confidence-building measures. Romania had 
tabled a proposal in 1957 for a Balkan nuclear-free zone, based on multilateral 
relations there. 
Romania did not regard a united Europe as necessarily a confederation, but a 
Europe which would find its own path to development, based on cooperation. 
The arms race and the danger of nuclear war both stood in the way of such a de-
velopment. In this context he found the recent resolution of  Parliament on coope-
ration between East and West Europe based on the Bettiza report to be inter-
esting. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, had recently empha-
sized that common values existed in East and West Europe and that the roots of 
such values were cultural, in the widest sense of the term. 
Professor Vlad explained that in 1984 186 books from all over the world had 
been translated into Romanian, of which 102 were from West Europe and 54 
from East Europe. 
In relation to the United Nations, Romania had proposed that the permanent 
members of the Security Council should abstain when they found it impossible to 
agree. He emphasized that the frontiers of East European countries were natural 
and had been recognized in international agreements and in the 197  5 Final Act of 
Helsinki. 
Romania favoured greater transparency on questions of disarmament and pub-
lished figures of its military expenditure. 
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